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Terrorism is the principal threat to global and national security in the post-11 
September world. Facing terrorist threats at home and abroad, the United States has 
declared counterterrorism its top priority. As the United States embarks on its global 
counterterrorism campaign, it must draw on the experience of other countries. 
Specifically India, with an extensive history of counterterrorism efforts, can reveal 
important lessons applicable to America’s endeavors. India offers three primary examples 
of counterterrorism strategies: Punjab, its northeast region, and Kashmir, from which four 
findings emerge. First, aggressive military operations are central to beating terrorism. 
Second, economic and social development programs, though not enough to end terrorism 
alone, are essential components of the larger national strategy. Third, terrorism cannot be 
stopped without international assistance. Terror networks export personnel, knowledge, 
weapons and money across international boundaries with growing frequency. This cannot 
be effectively stopped without a coordinated national and international effort. Fourth, to 
be successful, a counterterrorism strategy must engender the public’s support for the 
government and promulgate a sense of public ownership to the conflict. By applying 
these lessons from the Indian case study, America’s efforts to end terrorism both 
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Terrorism is the principal threat to global and national security in the post-11 
September world. The attacks on New York and Washington D.C. demonstrated that 
worldwide terrorist organizations are operating with increasing complexity, audacity and 
lethality. Terrorism is evolving into a significantly more menacing threat that uses 
technology to access financial reserves, disseminate instructions, and propagate its vitriol. 
Likewise, terrorist objectives have evolved from publicity ploys to deliberate attempts to 
inflict mass casualties.1 Additionally, the possibility of a nuclear, biological or chemical 
attack has added a perilous new head to the terrorist hydra. The reality of this threat has 
prompted U.S. officials to declare counterterrorism the nation’s top priority. The 
singularity of this mission is evident in the U.S. State Department’s declaration that 
counterterrorism is America’s number one strategic goal.2 
International cooperation is key to accomplishing this goal. Without the support 
of friendly nations, U.S. efforts to mitigate terrorist threats are substantially impaired. 
The United Nations, recognizing the critical nature of international counterterrorism 
cooperation, specifically directed its members to “work together urgently to prevent and 
suppress terrorist acts…through increased cooperation and full implementation of the 
relevant international conventions relating to terrorism.”3 By Washington’s own 
admission, the United States must have help to win its war on terrorism. Testifying before 
the U.S. Congress, Assistant Secretary of State Christine Rocca emphasized the critical 
nature of counterterrorism cooperation when she declared, “Our relationships with South 
Asian states have been central to our successful prosecution of the war on terrorism. All 
have been fully supportive, and their support in this war has been, and will continue to 
be, absolutely crucial.”4 This acute need of international cooperation has prompted the 
                                                 
1 Charles W. Kegley, Jr., The New Global Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls (Upper Saddle 
River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2003), 2.  
2 U.S. State Department, “Strategic Goal 1: Counterterrorism” in Department of State Performance Plan: 
2004; http://www.state.gov/m/rm/rls/perfplan/2004/20462.htm; accessed 2 February 2003. 
3 United Nations, Security Council Resolution 1373, September 2001; http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/ 
conflict/unre1373.htm; accessed 2 February 2004. 
4 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of International Terrorism—2002: South Asia Overview (Washington 
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002), 1. 
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United States to offer military, diplomatic, investigative and financial aid to over 170 
countries participating in the global war on terrorism.5  
However, for America to most effectively counter terrorism it must draw on the 
experience of other nations. Countries such as India have extensive counterterrorism 
knowledge that can greatly improve U.S. counterterrorism capabilities. In many instances 
America should adopt Indian counterterrorism strategies. At other times, India’s missteps 
may help the United States avoid counter-productive plans and detrimental methods. 
Though both countries face unique problems, have different political structures, and draw 
upon diverse counterterrorism resources, the similarities are sufficient to allow for 
important lessons. Identifying and implementing these lessons will dramatically enhance 
America’s domestic and international counterterrorism strategies. 
 
B.  BACKGROUND  
India is a particularly useful counterterrorism case study. Unlike the United 
States, India has extensive experience with terrorism. Indian Prime Minister Atal 
Vajpayee, in an address to the U.S. Congress, declared, “No country has faced as 
ferocious an attack of terrorist violence as India has over the past two decades. Many of 
you here in Congress have in recent hearings recognized a stark fact: no region is a 
greater source of terrorism than our neighborhood.”6  
Additionally, as the world’s largest multi-cultural democracy, India faces similar 
challenges in implementing its counterterrorism strategies as the United States—namely 
protecting civil liberties, the rule of law, and associated democratic characteristics while 
ensuring public security.  
India has faced various forms of terrorism including religious, ethnic, ideological, 
secessionist, and externally motivated. Vajpayee characterized terrorist violence as an 
attempt “to unravel the territorial integrity of India [and] show that a multi-religious 
society cannot exist.”7 New Delhi has also confronted separatists who use violence or the 
threat of violence in an attempt to gain sovereign territories. Separatist movements 
                                                 
5 U.S. Department of State, Progress Report on the Global War on Terrorism (Washington D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 2003); http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rpt/24087.htm; accessed 2 February 2004. 
6 Atal Vajpayee, “Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee’s Address to U.S. Congress,” Washington, D.C., 14 Sep 
2000, http://www.usindiafriendship.net/statements/vision/vision.html; accessed 2 February 2004. 
7 Ibid. 
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encompass much of the violence in India’s northeast and in Kashmir. For New Delhi 
these threats constitute direct challenges to India’s unity, sovereignty and democracy. 
Additionally, political activists, such as the left-wing Naxalite movement, have 
repeatedly used terror attacks to advance their particular political ideologies. 
These fountains of terrorism have produced rivers of violence, including 
bombings, hijackings, assassinations and hostage taking. The most significant terrorist 
attacks in India’s recent past include the Mumbai bombings of 15 August 2003 in which 
two large bombs, hidden in taxis, exploded in the city’s tourist and business districts. 
Fifty-two people were killed and 150 more wounded. Mumbai police accused the 
Pakistani Muslim militant group Lashkar-e-Tayyiba of conducting the attack.  
On 27 February 2002, Muslim extremists set fire to a train carrying Hindu 
pilgrims returning from the Ayodhya area. 295 passengers were burned to death. The 
attack sparked horrific violence as Hindu-Muslim riots ravaged the state of Gujarat, 
killing over 2,000 people. The tragedy followed nearly ten years of tensions touched off 
by the destruction of the Ayodha Mosque by Hindu fanatics on 6 December 1992.  
On 13 December 2001, five men attacked the Indian Parliament in New Delhi. 
Armed with guns, grenades and explosives, the suicide attackers waged a fifty-minute 
gun battle with security forces before they were killed. Fourteen people died from the 
attack that, occurring only three months after the 11 September attacks in America, 
sparked widespread international condemnation.  
On 12 March 1993, a series of fifteen bombs exploded throughout Mumbai killing 
317 people and wounding over 1000 others. Most sources cite Muslim terrorists as the 
perpetrators.  
On 21 May 1991, former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated 
during a campaign rally in the southern state of Tamil Nadu. The attack followed New 
Delhi’s attempt to use Indian Peacekeeping Forces in Sri Lanka to impose a cease-fire 
between the Sri Lankan government and Tamil separatists.  
Over the last two decades, fourteen Indian commercial airliners have been 
hijacked.8 The most egregious example was Indian Air Flight 182, which exploded over 
                                                 
8 K. P. S. Gill, “Terrorism, Institutional Collapse and Emergency Response Protocols,” in Terror and 
Containment: Perspectives on India’s Internal Security ed. K. P. S. Gill (New Delhi: Gyan, 2001), 256. 
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the Atlantic Ocean on 22 June 1985 after departing Canada. Four Sikh militants were 
convicted in Canada. All 329 passengers and crew were killed.  
On 31 October 1984, Sikh bodyguards assassinated then Prime Minister Indira 
Gandhi. The killing was in response to the Indian government’s failed counterterrorism 
strategy in Punjab, namely the debacle at the Golden Temple in Amritsar, five months 
earlier. Her assassins were convicted and hanged in 1989. 
 
 1. Indian Cases 
This thesis focuses on three cases of Indian counterterrorism efforts: Punjab, the 
northeastern states, and Kashmir. These cases are significant because they portray distinct 
characteristics of terrorism in India and demonstrate India’s most successful, marginally 
successful, and least successful results respectively. This thesis does not cover every 
Indian terrorist group. However, examining the most significant terrorist organizations 
and New Delhi’s responses can highlight similar challenges facing U.S. counterterrorism 
efforts both domestically and abroad. 
Punjab serves as the first example of Indian counterterrorism. Terrorists in Punjab 
sought to secede from India and create a new and independent nation called “Khalistan.” 
By manipulating particular aspects of the Sikh religion, Sikh terrorists began a virulent 
campaign of terror that quickly overflowed the state’s borders. Counterterrorism efforts 
in Punjab clearly demonstrate the critical, and often disastrous results of inconsistent 
counterterrorism policies. Ultimately, the Indian government’s experience in Punjab 
resulted in a hard-won victory as terrorism was virtually eliminated from the area. 
Lamentably, many of the lessons learned following the Punjab crisis were largely ignored 
by both political and military leaders in other counterterrorism venues throughout India—
highlighting the crucial need to draw on successful experience countering future terrorist 
challenges.  
Terrorism in India’s northeast serves as the second case study. The region has the 
unenviable distinction as being India’s longest counterterrorism battle, which is still 
continuing. Ethnic rivalries, economic inequalities, sub-nationalism, organized crime and 
clandestine foreign intervention are the key elements breeding terrorism in the region. 
The northeast as a whole is so removed from the rest of India, both geographically and 
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emotionally, that Indians in the rest of the country often characterize the northeast as a 
foreign land, often referred to by the central government as a “disturbed area” or a 
“special territory.” These barriers, both real and imagined, have stifled efforts to integrate 
the northeast into India proper and have fueled insurgent and terrorist motivations. The 
government’s vacillating counterterrorism plan in the region has yielded little success, 
though there are indications of improvement. Violence in most of the northeastern states 
has either remained steady or has declined in the last three years due primarily to 
improved counterterrorism strategies. However, a conclusive victory over terrorism in the 
northeast is anything but guaranteed. 
Kashmir represents India’s least successful struggle against terrorism. This third 
case is unique in many ways. One cannot discount the role of religion in propagating 
strife in the area. Undeniably, many aspects of terrorism in Kashmir are directly linked to 
religious intolerance. However, the suggestion that the issue revolves wholly around 
conflicting faiths is overly simplistic and misses many of the more fundamental 
motivations for the pervasive violence. The residual effects of the 1947 Partition still 
hinder peace and security in the region. Additionally, the involvement of foreign 
terrorists and their sponsors (such as Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency) 
have encumbered the Indian government’s counterterrorism efforts. The situation in 
Kashmir demonstrates that effective counterterrorism measures include the whole 
spectrum of political, economic and military responses. 
For each of these three cases, New Delhi has utilized a vast array of anti-terrorism 
methods ranging from engagement, concessions, political dialogue, disregard and 
military intervention. It has been waging its war on terrorism for many years, sometimes 
more successfully than others. For each success the Indian government has enjoyed 
against the militants, it has suffered the consequences of shortsighted policies and grave 
political missteps. If the United States is to be successful in its endeavors against 
terrorism worldwide, U.S. counterterrorism leaders must learn from India’s example by 
applying the effective when possible and avoiding the ineffective as needed. It must 
clearly assess the threats, analyze their critical weaknesses and leverage U.S. might—be 
it military, political, economic, judicial, investigative or social, against all enemies, both 
foreign and domestic. 
  6
 
2. America’s Experience 
Unlike India, the United States has enjoyed relative separation from terrorist 
events before 11 September 2001. Prior to that date, most of the significant terrorist 
attacks affecting America occurred away from the continental United States. Embassy 
bombings and the attack on the USS Cole marked the most serious examples of anti-U.S. 
terrorist attacks—all occurring overseas. Within the geographic national borders there 
were few major terrorist actions. Among the most notable was the 1994 pipe bomb 
explosion during the Summer Olympic games in Atlanta, Georgia. The following year a 
car bomb exploded in a basement of the World Trade Center. Later, Timothy McVeigh 
was arrested for his attack on the Oklahoma City Federal Building. However examples of 
terrorism in the United States, especially when compared to India, were relatively limited 
prior to the attacks on New York and Washington. 
After 11 September 2001 much changed. In the words of President Bush, “Night 
fell on a different world.”9 The terrorist attacks on New York and Washington served as a 
powerful wake-up call to Americans everywhere. It was one of the largest, most 
complicated, most audacious and devastating terrorist attacks ever. No longer could 
Americans enjoy the luxury of insularity and geographical separation from threats. The 
enemy was within the gates. The U.S. Government scrambled to assuage fears and 
develop a coherent plan of action. In some regards, this was unexplored territory for 
America. 
In its initial efforts to secure America’s safety and bolster public confidence, the 
Bush administration made sweeping changes. It allocated tremendous financial resources 
to anti-terrorist initiative. It terminated certain organizations (such as the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service), created new ones (such as the Department of Homeland 
Security), and reorganized others (such as moving the U.S. Coast Guard from the 
Department of Transportation to the new Department of Homeland Security). And of 
course, the government turned to the military.  
President Bush declared to the nation that a “global war on terrorism” had begun 
and shortly thereafter employed the U.S. armed forces against al-Qaeda and the Taliban 
                                                 
9 Kegley, The New Global Terrorism, 3. 
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in Afghanistan. On 20 September 2001, only nine days after the fall of the twin towers in 
New York City, President Bush demanded the capitulation of the Taliban when he 
declared: 
These demands are not open to negotiation or discussion. The Taliban 
must act, and act immediately. They will hand over the terrorists, or they 
will share in their fate. Our war on terror begins with al-Qaeda, but it does 
not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has 
been found, stopped and defeated.”10 
 
The six months following the 11 September attacks were dizzying times for the 
federal government as the United States set off on a largely uncharted course. The phrase 
“homeland security” was pervasive in political discourse, popular media and the 
American psyche. As military planes flew combat air patrols over the nation’s cities, 
Washington was resolute to prevent another attack on America. “Whatever the cost,” 
declared the President, “we will pay it.”11 
The United States, however, must contend with terrorist threats that far exceed the 
scope of homeland security. Terrorists, employing a plethora of both common and 
ingenious methods, routinely target American civilians and military forces abroad. U.S. 
involvement in Iraq has created a new front for the global war on terrorism prompting, to 
date, almost daily bombings, ambushes and assassinations.  
Additionally, trends in international terrorism indicate that terrorist attacks are 
increasingly common. Since 1945, the world’s larger armies have spent more time 
fighting counter-insurgencies and anti-terrorist actions than in conventional “force-on-
force” engagements.12 Over the last thirty years terrorist attacks have increasingly 
involved suicide and are escalating in both tempo and location.13 The threat to American 
interests is becoming more acute as well. Usama bin Laden issued a fatwa in 1998, “to 
kill the Americans and their allies…in any country in which it is possible to do it.”14 As a 
                                                 
10 George W. Bush, “Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People,” Washington, D.C., 
20 September 2001; http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html; accessed 2 
February 2004. 
11 George W. Bush, “The President’s State of the Union Address,” Washington, D.C., 29 January 2002; 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html; accessed 2 February 2004. 
12 Walter Laqueur, Guerrilla: A Historical and Critical Study (Boston: Little & Brown, 1976), 8.  
13 Robert Pape, “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism,” American Political Science Review 97, no. 3 
(2003): 3. 
14 Usama bin Laden, “Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders: World Islamic Front Statement,” 23 February 
1998; http://www.library.cornell.edu/colldev/mideast/wif.html; accessed 5 Jan 2003. 
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result, the need for developing a sound and effective counterterrorism plan is becoming 
even more acute. 
 
C.  PURPOSE AND FINDINGS 
This thesis evaluates the prospects for improving U.S. counterterrorism efforts by 
examining the case study of India. India’s experience in dealing with terrorists and 
insurgents may prove invaluable to those most closely involved in U.S. counterterrorism 
policy and implementation. The United States can learn many lessons on anti-terrorism, 
both positive and negative, by scrutinizing India’s attempts to mitigate violence. In doing 
so, certain questions arise. What are India’s most significant terrorist challenges? What 
are the motivations and objectives of terrorists in India? What has the Indian government 
done to combat terrorism and which of India’s responses have been most effective? 
Why? What is the prognosis for India’s counterterrorism plan? What are the major 
similarities and differences between the terrorist threats facing each respective country? 
What elements of Indian anti-terrorism efforts should the United States seek to 
implement or avoid?  
This thesis makes four central arguments. First, aggressive military operations are 
essential to counterterrorism efforts. Efforts to forgo violence in lieu of a politically 
negotiated settlement rarely yield acceptable results. This conclusion contradicts those of 
counterterrorism theorists like Peter Sederberg, who suggest that political conciliation 
may be the most effective government response.15 Military forces must establish durable 
and effective ties to local security services that are the key to unraveling the complex 
knot of terrorist organizations. Cooperative counterterrorism efforts can dramatically 
reduce, if not eliminate, the presence of active terrorist cells. However, military force 
must be used in ways that avoid provoking more terrorism and engendering public 
sympathy for the terrorists’ cause. Poorly planned, improperly implemented or overly 
harsh military actions can have devastating results that strengthen the terrorists’ position 
and prolong the overall campaign.  
                                                 
15 Peter C. Sederberg, “Global Terrorism: Problems of Challenge and Response,” in The New Global 
Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls ed. Charles W. Kegley, Jr. (Upper Saddle River: Prentice 
Hall, 2003), 275. 
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Second, economic aid and social development programs are a key component to 
the overall counterterrorism strategy. As India’s case reveals, these plans do not 
guarantee success, for peace cannot be purchased. However, an absence of social 
development programs, particularly in areas already experiencing terrorism, will virtually 
ensure increased violence.  
Third, international assistance is vital to an effective counterterrorism strategy. 
This comprises much more than just direct security assistance. Judicial access to the 
terrorists’ overseas supporters is usually unobtainable without the help of foreign 
governments. India’s case demonstrates that stopping cross border flows of terrorists, 
weapons, and funding depends heavily on international cooperation.  
Fourth, the general public must adopt the counterterrorism struggle as its own for 
terrorism to truly be defeated. No amount of police or military actions will ever suffice as 
long as the society feels that the suffering caused by terrorists is bearable. In India, 
terrorism has been eradicated when populations turned against the terrorists. In places 
where the government has failed to engender this feeling, violence persists. This final 
point has particular importance on U.S. operations in places like Iraq because terrorists 
have transitioned from exclusively targeting American military members to Iraqi citizens 
at large. These four findings are prevalent throughout India’s counterterrorism efforts. 
However, many additional lessons can be drawn from each of India’s specific encounters 
with terrorist violence and can serve as a touchstone for America’s global 
counterterrorism strategy. 
 
D.  ORGANIZATION 
This thesis consists of five chapters. Chapter I presents the current anti-terrorism 
situation in India and the United States, provides a brief background, presents the thesis, 
its questions, major findings, and its organization. Chapter II examines terrorism and 
Sikh separatism in Punjab. The Punjab case is particularly relevant because, despite its 
exceedingly deadly nature—over 21,000 people killed by terrorists—it represents India’s 
most successful counterterrorism effort.16 Chapter III analyzes terrorist movements and 
insurgency in India’s northeast, focusing primarily on the states of Assam, Nagaland and 
                                                 
16 Vajpayee, “Address to U.S. Congress,” 1. 
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Tripura. Though the situation in each state is slightly different, terrorism in the northeast 
as a whole has been moderately controlled in recent years. Chapter IV assesses 
counterterrorism efforts in Kashmir. Despite years of effort, United Nations intervention, 
and thousands of deaths, the Kashmir region remains India’s most vexing 
counterterrorism problem. Chapter V concludes with a summary of India’s most and least 
effective anti-terrorism measures, an outline of the key similarities and differences 
between the terrorism problem in the United States and India, and recommendations for 
U.S. counterterrorism policy makers.  
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II.  SIKH SEPARATISM 
 
 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
India’s most successful counterterrorism campaign occurred against Sikh 
terrorists in Punjab. Violence began there in 1978 and ravaged the region for nearly 
twenty years. Driven by separatism and fueled by ethnic and religious fervor, the Sikh 
insurgency tested India’s counterterrorism capabilities to the maximum. After numerous 
failed approaches, New Delhi ended the autonomy movement by balancing military force 
with peaceful engagement. Yet creating that strategy was a long and difficult process 
fraught with numerous failures and tragedies. 
New Delhi’s response to terrorism in Punjab was often painfully inconsistent. The 
government first characterized the problem as merely criminal in nature. This relegated 
the issue to a lower priority in New Delhi as lawmakers and political leaders pushed it 
behind other agendas, often undermining what little progress had been made in the fight 
against terrorism. Its slow response to rising discontent, its “hands-off” attitude vis-à-vis 
Punjab’s state government, and its sporadic (though at times draconian) use of military 
force greatly impeded the Indian government’s efforts to deal with terrorism in Punjab. 
By reacting too slowly, and then over-reacting with excessive, and often misdirected, 
force, New Delhi actually bolstered the terrorists’ status and prolonged the ordeal. India 
tragically underestimated the widespread appeal of Sikh terrorism and was left with few 
effective countermeasures. 
Punjab paid dearly for New Delhi’s ineffective counterterrorism strategy. 
According to Indian Prime Minister Atal Vajpayee, in the twenty years that terrorism was 
most acute in the region, terrorists killed over 21,000 people in Punjab alone.17 Sikh 
terrorists targeted many senior political and law enforcement personnel. The most notable 
assassination occurred on 31 October 1984 when India’s Prime Minister Indira Gandhi 
died at the hands of Sikh assassins working as her bodyguards. The killing sparked 
horrific anti-Sikh violence in Delhi, Kanpur and other parts of the country. Sikh terrorists 
have also either hijacked or bombed numerous commercial passenger aircraft—the most 
                                                 
17 Atal Vajpayee, “Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee’s Address to U.S. Congress,” Washington, D.C., 14 Sep 
2000; http://www.usindiafriendship.net/statements/vision/vision.html; accessed 2 February 2004. 
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catastrophic example being Air India’s flight 182 that exploded near the coast of Ireland 
on 23 June 1985. All 329 passengers perished. 
As terrorism escalated in and around Punjab, the Indian government scrambled to 
improve its counterterrorism strategy. With fatalities increasing and economic and social 
costs on the rise, New Delhi began a series of radical course changes hoping to crack the 
counterterrorism code. However, these new policies often lacked precise planning and 
implementation, which further undermined public confidence and hampered inter-agency 
cooperation. A break came in the early 1990s when a series of factors combined to boost 
the government’s counterterrorism fortunes. Following sweeping policy changes, 
violence sharply declined and a tenuous peace was restored to Punjab for the first time in 
decades. 
The case of Punjab is significant to U.S. counterterrorism policy makers because 
it highlights New Delhi’s best practices in the fight against terrorism. Many of these can 
be applied to certain U.S. counterterrorism efforts. Concurrently it illustrates the dangers 
of inconsistent, uncoordinated and half-hearted efforts. This chapter offers three key 
lessons applicable for U.S. policy leaders and military commanders. First, 
counterterrorism strategy must be clearly defined and consistently followed. By changing 
its position on terrorism and alternating is approach to the various terror organizations in 
Punjab, New Delhi severely limited its ability to counter their strategies and improve its 
own relationship with the general population. Once the Indian government clearly 
defined its goals and methods—and stuck to those definitions faithfully—its 
counterterrorism operations began to bear fruit. 
Second, regional counterterrorism efforts like those in Punjab are only successful 
when spearheaded by an effective and highly motivated local security apparatus. Years of 
neglect and mismanagement transformed the Punjabi police into a hollow shell of a force 
that was ill-equipped, poorly trained, distrusted, and suffering very low morale. 
Significant changes dramatically improved the situation. New leaders energized the 
police force while better equipment and improved training helped turn the tide against the 
militants. Terrorist attacks against the police and their families that had previously 
demoralized the force, subsequently hardened its resolve and strengthened its cohesion. 
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The decline of terrorism in Punjab directly correlates to the dramatic improvements to the 
state’s local security capabilities. 
Third, military force must be applied with extreme care. During most of the 
counterterrorism effort in Punjab the Indian government vacillated between periods of 
either half-hearted and uncoordinated counterterrorist operations or extreme—and 
occasionally indiscriminant—violence. Heavy-handedness subjected New Delhi to 
scathing criticism by international human rights groups and created groundswells of anti-
Delhi sentiment that ultimately prolonged the conflict. Terrorist organizations quickly 
exploited the situation to  acquired greater funding, enhanced international legitimacy, 
and additional recruits. New Delhi’s situation improved considerably when local, state, 
and federal security forces began to operate in a more coordinated and less oppressive 
fashion. A well-trained, well-equipped, and highly disciplined security apparatus can 
simultaneously eradiate terror cells and engender public confidence and support. 
This chapter begins with a brief background on Sikhism, Sikh separatism, and the 
rise of the Sikh terrorist threat in India. It then presents India’s early and later 
counterterrorism strategies, and demonstrates which modifications yielded the greatest 
results. It concludes with lessons applicable to U.S. forces and policy makers as they 
encounter similar terrorist threats and counterterrorism challenges. 
 
B.  BACKGROUND 
1. Sikhism 
 Though Sikhs comprise just over two percent of India’s population, they are 
India’s third most prominent religious and ethnic group. Sikhs are encountered 
commonly throughout most of India but are concentrated in the northwest state of Punjab, 
the historical seat of Sikh religion and culture. As a result of perceived religious and 
political grievances, during the late 1970s Sikh hardliners began agitating for secession 
from India. They demanded a separate Sikh state located between India and Pakistan 
incorporating Punjab and some adjoining areas. They named this proposed state 
Khalistan.18 The demand for a separate Sikh homeland had support from a large section 
of Sikh diaspora living in the United States, Europe, and other countries.  
                                                 
18 The word “Khalsa” in Punjabi means “pure.” “Khalistan,” therefore, meant “The Land of the Pure.” 
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 Sikhism often has been characterized as a hybrid of Hinduism and Islam. There 
are shared elements among the three religions, yet Sikhism is much more than a religious 
amalgamation. Its theology, culture, and social structure have great bearing on Sikh 
separatism and terrorist attacks. It must be noted that Sikh terrorists, as is the case with 
most religious extremists, represent a very small minority of the greater Sikh community. 
While this thesis focuses on the extremist fringe, the vast majority of Sikhs worldwide 
are as appalled by terrorism as is the rest of the non-Sikh world. Though this thesis does 
not examine Sikh theology and doctrine, there are three social and cultural aspects of 
Sikhism that lend directly to militancy and terrorism: the Panth (or greater Sikh identity), 
historic grievances, and political activism. Understanding these key elements of Sikh 
tradition and history clarifies elements of modern Sikh militancy and terrorism.  
 
2. The Panth 
Sikhs worldwide view themselves as part of a large collective whole known as the 
Panth. This became particularly important after 1699. Anti-Sikh persecution by Muslim 
leaders was severe, leading the tenth Guru, Gobind Singh, to establish a new ethos in the 
Sikh community of a saint-soldier. Sikhs, who were already renowned for their military 
prowess, began to internalize the concept of defending the greater Sikh community. The 
Panth is similar in scope to the Muslim concept of the Umma in that it is a strong 
communal bond based on religion that tightly binds all believers regardless of their 
physical location.19  
In a modern context, the Panth serves as the foundation for vast overseas 
populations of Sikhs. Known colloquially as “outside Sikhs,” these groups are greatest in 
England, Canada, and the United States and are a major source of ideological and 
material support to Sikhs still living in Punjab.20 The notion of the Panth under attack is a 
very evocative image for most Sikhs. This concept is crucial in that it has been 
                                                 
19 Ira M. Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 23-24.  
20 B. Singh, “Seminar on Khalistan Held in Punjab” Press Release by the Council of Khalistan, 18 
December 2003, http://www.khalistan.com/PressReleasees/PR121803_Seminaron_Khalistan.htm; accessed 
2 February 2004. 
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manipulated multiple times by Sikh terrorist leaders, who seek to enflame popular 
sentiment against occupying forces or dissenting political parties. 
 
3. Grievances 
Perceptions of anti-Sikh prejudice are deep-seated in Sikh communities. Both oral 
and written histories are rife with stories of anti-Sikh extermination campaigns dating 
back to at least 1606 with the martyrdom of the fifth guru, Arjun Dev. Later, the tenth 
guru, Gobind Singh, established the Khalsa, a militant social organization, for the 
purpose of defending the faith. Popular Sikh tradition relishes the role of militant 
defiance to external threats such as that posed by the Mughal rulers. Historical accuracies 
are less important than the inspirational effects these stories have on their listeners. 
India’s partition in 1947 gave rise to perhaps the most tangible example of 
modern Sikh resentment. At the time, great consideration was given to Hindus and 
Muslim communities in and around Punjab. The creation of a Muslim homeland in 
Pakistan prompted many religious and ethnic groups, including the Punjabi Sikhs, to call 
for greater autonomy or outright independence. However, the Sikhs felt excluded from 
the political process and viewed the partition as particularly unjust.21  Over two million 
Sikhs were driven from their fertile lands after these ended up on Pakistan’s side of the 
newly drawn border. Sikhs also lost the prestige they had enjoyed under British rule and 
preferential recruitment into the armed forces.22 
Grievances grew during the 1960s as Sikhs began to feel that their religion and 
their social structure faced the subtle threat of absorption into Hinduism.23 Though the 
two groups had long-standing cultural and historical ties that drew on centuries of 
interaction, there has commonly been a vocal section among Sikhs that viewed Hinduism 
as a threat. Khushwant Singh, a preeminent Sikh historian, wrote that, “If the present 
state of amalgamation continues, there is little doubt that before the century has run its 
                                                 
21 Yohna Alexander, Combating Terrorism: Strategies of Ten Countries (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 2002), 304. 
22 Ved Marwah, Uncivil Wars: Pathology of Terrorism in India (New Delhi: Centre for Policy Research, 
1996), 153. 
23 Col. Raju G. C. Thomas, “Reflections on the Kashmir Problem” in Perspectives on Kashmir: The Roots 
of Conflict in South Asia (Boulder: Westview, 1992), 12.  
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course the Sikh religion will have become a branch of Hinduism and the Sikhs a part of 
the Hindu social system.”24 
 
4. Political Activism 
Sikh violence and political activism have been inextricable intertwined in Punjab. 
The Sikhs’ chief political organization has been the Akali Dal party, which has fought 
since its founding to advance Sikhism both as a theology and as a social organization.25 
The Akali Dal’s primary objective is to counter threats to the Panth. From early in its 
existence the Akali Dal party represented an amalgamation of fervent religiosity and 
secular Sikh interests. This focus provided the Akali Dal with a very dynamic base of 
support among Sikhs. The party later began attracting military members and certain 
extremist organizations giving it its militant foundation. The Akali Dal then began a 
systematic effort to advance Sikh extremism, promoting the ideas of various militant 
leaders in an effort to weaken the influence of the Congress party. Their efforts soon spun 
out of control. Though there have been instances of Sikh terrorism not directly associated 
with the Akali Dal, the party has played the most significant role in Punjabi militant and 
insurgent ideology. 
 
C.  CONFLICT DYNAMICS 
1. Primary Objectives 
The primary objective of Sikh terrorism is the creation of an independent Sikh 
nation called Khalistan. According to some Sikh militants, Khalistan should be annexed 
from India much the same way that Pakistan was formed from the partition. Another 
goal, at least for the Akali Dal, was to increase its political influence both in Punjab and 
vis-à-vis New Delhi. During the late 1970s the Akali Dal had formed an uneasy coalition 
with the BJP and under the leadership of Prakash Singh Badal, maintained a tenuous hold 
on power in Punjab. The seeds of violence, nonetheless, had begun to take root.  
                                                 
24 Khushwant Singh, History of the Sikhs Volume 2: 1839-1988 (Colombia: South Asia Books, 1999), 185. 
25 In Punjabi, Akali Dal means “The Followers of the Almighty.” The central role of fervent religiosity in 
the Akali Dal party has been widely documented.  
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Indira Gandhi’s administration, however, imposed a state of emergency in Punjab 
and dismissed Badal’s government for failing to stem rising pro-Khalistan sentiment.26 
This was a humiliating blow to the Akali Dal, which then capitalized on the incident. By 
portraying New Delhi’s actions as evidence of New Delhi’s anti-Sikh tendencies, many 
Sikhs were drawn to the increasingly radical ideas of the ousted Akali leadership. Badal 
and the Akali Dal began to more openly demonstrate their anti-Delhi and anti-Hindu 
leanings. The Akali leadership, frustrated at every turn, became bitter, opening the way 
for the extremists to take control of politics in Punjab.27 As power began to slip away, the 
party became increasingly attractive to the more radical and violent Punjabis. 
 
2. Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale 
The preeminent leader of the militant Sikh movement was Jarnail Singh 
Bhindranwale. Bhindranwale and the Akali Dal, though not originally associated, formed 
a very natural and dangerous union. Bhindranwale led a fundamentalist Sikh movement 
anxious to purify Sikhism from more liberal doctrinal interpretations. On 13 April 1978, 
Bhindranwale led a procession of his followers in a protest against a rival group. The 
event turned violent and ended only after Punjabi police fired into the melee, killing 
eighteen of Bhindranwale’s followers.28 This incident fueled a wave of resentment among 
Sikhs throughout Punjab that was particularly acute in the rural areas. 
Two years later came Badal’s dismissal followed by humiliating losses in local 
Assembly elections. This motivated Akali leaders to adopt more extreme and violent 
positions and the party raised a new slogan of the “Panth in danger.” The Akali Dal 
began demanding increasing concessions from the government and agitating the public at 
every turn. Their demands culminated in a declaration of Dharma Yudh, or a religious 
war, against rival Punjabi politicians.29 
However, it was Bhindranwale who most radicalized the Sikh nationalist 
platform. By emphasizing the Sikhs’ militant tradition, Bhindranwale justified his 
                                                 
26 In India, a state of emergency is known as “President’s Rule” which, when declared, gives the federal 
government wide power in administering state affairs, to include troop deployments and military 
operations. However, the out-right dismissal of the entire state government was widely criticized nation-
wide and particularly in Punjab. 
27 Marwah, Uncivil Wars, 159. 
28 Ibid., 160. 
29 Ibid., 169. 
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movement’s violence and openly declared that his primary objective was to “eliminate all 
the heretics” and others who opposed his demands.30 The Akali Dal faced a hard reality. 
The party could either join Bhindranwale, who was rapidly becoming the only political 
force of consequence, or it could be relegated to complete insignificance. Not 
surprisingly, it united with Bhindranwale. This amounted to a major victory for 
Bhindranwale that gave him both meteoric popular support and the trappings of political 
legitimacy. 
There were many distinct groups conducting attacks in Punjab. Though not all 
were directly associated with Bhindranwale, the vast majority were heavily influenced by 
his ideologies—if not his personal leadership. Some of the more significant terrorist 
organizations in Punjab include the Khalistan Liberation Force (KLF), the All India Sikh 
Student’s Federation (AISSF), the Bhindranwale Tiger Force of Khalistan (BTFK), the 
Khalistan Commando Force (KCF), and the Babbar Khalsa (BK). Though all the terrorist 
groups in Punjab were violent and extremely dangerous, the BK was arguably the most 
deadly of them all. The majority of Punjab’s terrorist groups lacked much sophistication 
in their attacks. Both their equipment and techniques were rudimentary at best. However, 
the BK was significantly more dangerous. Many of its members received weapons 
training in Pakistan and had practical experience from Afghanistan. For this reason, the 
Babbar Khalsa was able to employ sophisticated explosives and conduct very methodical 
attacks, making them the most feared of Punjab’s terrorists.31 
Terrorism in Punjab was at its worst from 1983 to 1993. Though Bhindranwale’s 
supporters had resorted to violence prior to 1983, deaths that year spiked to seventy-three 
from only ten the year before. The sheer speed and force of the terrorist attacks caught 
most Punjabis, and the Indian government, by surprise and prompted many to call 1983 
“The Year of the Armageddon.”32 Yet the violence was only beginning. 
Fatalities continued to escalate over the following six years and by 1989 civilian 
casualties numbered over 5,000.33  State security forces were alarmingly ineffective at 
                                                 
30 Ibid., 162. 
31 K. P. S. Gill, Terrorism and Containment: Perspectives on India’s Internal Security (New Delhi: Gyan, 
2001), 48. 
32 Chand Joshi, Bhindranwale: Myth and Reality (New Delhi: Vikas, 1984), 126. 
33 K. P. S. Gill, “Endgame in Punjab: 1988-1993” in Faultlines 1; http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/publica-
tion/faultlines/volume1/article3.htm; accessed 28 November 2003. 
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countering the growing threat and were increasingly targeted for attack. Terrorists in 
Punjab focused primarily on political leaders and the poorly trained state police force that 
by 1988 was largely demoralized. 
From 1990 to 1991 the situation took a dramatic turn for the worse. Nearly as 
many casualties were reported in those two years—5,058—as in the preceding twelve. 
Additionally, terrorist groups were gaining territory. Prior to 1990, most terrorist 
concentrations were only along the peripheral districts of Punjab. However, by the end of 
1991, terrorists had gained free movement in over sixty-one percent of the state. Terrorist 
groups controlled vast swaths of the state and ruled the towns by posting religious 
decrees on signposts. Eggs, meat, and alcohol were strictly outlawed in the name of 
religious purity. News sources such as local papers were told what to publish—they 
rarely disobeyed.34 Recruitment into the terrorist ranks was increasing rapidly and by 
1992 it appeared that the terrorists were on the verge of winning. Throughout Punjab, 
there was an air of absolute certainty that the war against the Indian government was in 
its final stages and that Khalistan’s establishment was imminent. Complete governments 
in exile were created in England and America, just waiting for their impending victory.35 
The situation was desperate and was rapidly spiraling out of control. The government’s 
success was anything but guaranteed.  
 
D.  INDIA’S EARLY COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY 
 India’s counterterrorism strategy vis-à-vis Punjab can be divided into two distinct 
eras. The first encompassed the years 1978 to approximately 1992. These years were 
marked by vacillation, indecision, and horrific violence. After 1992, the Indian 
government’s counterterrorism plan changed dramatically and began to reap success. The 
levels of violence fell precipitously and, though there were still sporadic attacks, the 
security situation in Punjab improved dramatically. Normalcy was finally restored. These 
two time periods reveal important operational and strategic counterterrorism lessons. 
In the early years, New Delhi tried many different strategies to counter rising 
terrorism in Punjab. These efforts were largely schizophrenic, vacillating from various 
                                                 
34 “Peace at Last In Punjab,” The Economist, 22 May 1993, 45. 
35 Gill, “Endgame in Punjab: 1988-1993,” 21.  
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extremes without direction or coordination. Not surprisingly the results were tragic. 
During this early period, New Delhi alternately tried three main tactics to deal with Sikh 
terrorism: ignoring it, negotiating with it, and violently suppressing it.  
For many years, New Delhi, and by extension the Punjab state government, 
simply ignored the growing terrorist crisis or minimized its importance. For instance, 
though terrorist cadres were rapidly increasing during the early 1980s, neither the state 
nor the federal government increased its security forces in any significant way. In 1982, 
Bhindranwale made a very clever tactical decision. He relocated his headquarters into the 
Golden Temple complex at Amritsar, the holiest of all Sikh shrines and began stockpiling 
guns, ammunition, and explosives. The government took no action at all. On 24 April 
1983, terrorists murdered the Deputy Inspector General of the Punjab police in front of 
hundreds of witnesses after he had concluded his prayers in the Golden Temple. The 
Punjab government again failed to act, having become “a prisoner of its own 
indecision.”36 Later, newspaper articles were replete with reports of the storage of 
advanced weaponry in the Golden Temple. The militants, ecstatic over their growing 
arsenals, were unabashedly displaying them to the Indian and foreign media, yet again 
New Delhi failed to act.37 The government’s indifference and political paralysis 
emboldened the terrorists and undermined public confidence.  
New Delhi’s second tactic was to engage the hardliners in political dialogue. 
During these attempts it seemed as if the Indian government was myopically fixated on a 
political solution above all else. Yet despite numerous peace accords, political 
concessions, prisoner releases, economic incentives and diplomatic missions, terrorism 
continually escalated. After years of dismal failures New Delhi eventually abandoned the 
conventional view that a political solution was essential to ending terrorism.  
The government finally turned to oppressive military operations. Unfortunately, 
the years of terrorist “victories” had so fractured the cohesion between the various local, 
state, and federal security forces, that most of these operations were failures before they 
even began. Often lacking adequate planning, equipment, and coordination, these 
missions failed to stop the terrorists while they increased public resentment, lowered 
                                                 
36 Marwah, Uncivil Wars, 167. 
37 Ibid., 171. 
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popular confidence in the government, and ultimately strengthened the terrorist’s position 
vis-à-vis the general population.  
 
1. Operation Bluestar 
The most glaring example of uncoordinated and misdirected military force was 
the unmitigated failure of Operation Bluestar. In an effort to suppress the Punjab 
insurgency, Indira Gandhi directed the Indian army to capture or kill Bhindranwale and 
his supporters who were ensconced in the Golden Temple complex. Mrs. Gandhi was 
reluctant to choose a military force but, after being assured that it would be a brief and 
effective campaign, eventually assented.38 The climax occurred on 5 June 1984 when 
Indian forces stormed the Golden Temple in Amritsar to dislodge militants garrisoned 
within the confines of the Sikh’s holiest shrine. According to the operation’s commander, 
Lt. General K. S. Brar of the Indian army, there were assumed to be 1,500 armed 
militants in the temple complex, of whom 500 were assumed to be well trained and 
highly motivated.39 
Prior to the arrival of the Indian military, insurgents had made significant 
preparations. Bhindranwale’s chief advisor was a retired major general, Shahbeg Singh. 
Singh and Bhindranwale had spent months fortifying the surrounding areas. Armed 
militants overtook seventeen three- and four-story buildings surrounding the temple 
complex. These buildings were heavily fortified, provided good fields of fire, 
incorporated surveillance posts, and were stockpiled with light machine guns, automatic 
weapons, and vast quantities of ammunitions and explosives. Additionally, insurgents 
linked the various buildings with hidden tunnels and had armed them with extensive 
booby traps. These preparations allowed the militants to monitor activities in and around 
the temple with relative impunity.40 To complicate the issue, Indian intelligence knew 
very few details of the militant fortifications within the temple complex and the 
                                                 
38 Ibid., 172. 
39 Lt. Gen. K. S. Brar, Operation Bluestar: The True Story (New Delhi: UBSPD, 1993), 49-58. 
40 C. Christine Fair, “Military Operations in Urban Areas: The Indian Experience,” India Review 2, no. 1 
(London: Frank Cass, 2003), 64.  
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surrounding area. This lack of critical information, coupled with extensive preparations 
by the Sikh militants, greatly compounded the mission’s difficulty.41 
To support the operation the Indian army brought in six tanks, heavy artillery, 
four infantry fighting vehicles, and three armored personnel carriers.42 Yet despite initial 
army estimates that the temple would be cleared in a matter of hours, fighting still raged 
after three days. The Indian army suffered thirty-five percent casualties and, according to 
the Indian government’s White Paper, 4,712 people were killed by the time it was over.43 
Among the dead were Bhindranwale and many of his staunchest supporters. The army 
action caused extensive damage to some prominent structures in the temple complex, 
including the Akal Takht and various Sikh museums and libraries. 
The negative consequences of Operation Bluestar are difficult to overstate. Sikhs 
worldwide, and especially those living in and around Punjab, saw Bluestar as a direct 
attack on the Sikh religion. Bhindranwale, anticipating some sort of government reprisal 
to his commandeering of the Golden Temple, had distributed propaganda throughout 
Punjab warning of an impending attack on Sikhism. To many it seemed as if his 
prophecy—self-fulfilling as it was—had come true. The timing of Operation Bluestar 
added to its ignominy in that it coincided with the anniversary of Guru Arjun Dev’s 
martyrdom, a Sikh holy day that drew a larger number of pilgrims to the Golden Temple 
than usual. At least two army units comprised of Sikh troops (400 Sikh soldiers in 
Rajasthan and over 1,400 solders in Ramgarth, Bihar) revolted in protest.44 Brigadier 
General R. C. Puri, the commandant of the Regimental Center in Bihar, was gunned 
down by his revolting Sikh soldiers. 
                                                 
41 In an effort to avoid inflaming public sentiments about the Sikh’s sanctuary, security forces, prior to the 
operation, were prohibited from entering the temple. This self-imposed restraint, coupled with the 
militant’s control within the temple, severely hindered intelligence collection on militant actions and 
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42 Brar, Operation Bluestar, 30-31. 
43 Government of India, White Paper on the Punjab Agitation—A Summary (New Delhi, Government of 
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The army followed up its efforts in Amritsar with another ill-advised and poorly 
conducted attempt to exterminate the militants. Known as Operation Wood Rose, the 
Indian army attempted to “mop up” remaining Bhindranwale supporters throughout the 
state and focused its efforts on Sikh religious centers.45 The effort suffered from 
numerous flaws. First, an extraneous force was sent into unfamiliar territory to operate 
among a politically charged, and at times hostile, population. Second, the army was given 
great latitude in its use of force, which prompted, if not condoned, excesses. Third, 
military forces suffered from a critical lack of knowledge of the area and its people. 
According to K. P. S. Gill, the army operated blindly, arresting many innocent people 
who were in no way connected to terrorist or criminal activity.46 Sikhs overwhelmingly 
saw the operation as further humiliation. Operation Wood Rose was as damaging to New 
Delhi as was Operation Bluestar. Instead of isolating the terrorists, these efforts 
ultimately united the Sikhs behind the secessionist forces.47 
Four months after the Bluestar and Wood Rose debacles, Sikh militants exacted 
revenge by assassinating then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. Consequently, horrific anti-
Sikh riots ravaged Delhi for three days with Indian police doing very little to stop it. Ved 
Marwah claims that over 3,000 Sikhs were burnt alive in Delhi alone.48 Operation 
Bluestar and the November massacres were, according to Gill, “the two most significant 
victories for the cause of ‘Khalistan’…not won by the militants, but inflicted upon the 
nation by the government. These two events, in combination, gave a new lease of life to a 
movement which could easily have been contained in 1984 itself.”49 
Following the failure of its oppressive military strategy, the government under 
Rajiv Gandhi again opted for a negotiated political solution. Talks were held with various 
hard-line organizations including the Akali Dal and the AISSF, who at the time were the 
preeminent terrorist groups. New Delhi acquiesced to demands for a popular election 
                                                 
45 Sikh religious centers are known as Gurudwaras. They are roughly analogous to Islamic madrassas in 
Pakistan or, in some aspects, to certain Christian seminaries. Army actions against the Gurudwaras, though 
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that, not surprisingly, the Akali Dal won easily. Other militant groups boycotted the 
elections. 
Additional political concessions included the release of over 2,000 imprisoned 
terrorists as a show of “good faith.” Those released promptly resumed their terrorist 
tactics. In the three months following their release, nearly twice as many civilians and 
policemen were killed than in the entire twelve-month period preceding their liberty.50 
Astoundingly the government also agreed to return the Golden Temple to the Akali Dal, 
who subsequently surrendered it to the terrorists. Terrorist groups then rearmed the 
temple grounds, created the “Committee of the Golden Temple,” and issued a formal 
“Declaration of Khalistan” on 29 April 1986. New Delhi’s attempt at a political solution 
had failed as miserably as had Operation Bluestar. 
 
E.  INDIA’S COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY REVOLUTION 
After over a decade of escalating violence in Punjab, India’s counterterrorism 
strategy began to change in 1989 and was drastically altered by 1992. Indian political and 
military leaders learned from Amritsar that a new course was in order. Indian historians 
have suggested that the calamity of Operation Bluestar forced civilian and military 
leaders to reassess their handling of similar terrorist events.51 The first indication of that 
reassessment was Operation Black Thunder, which proved that with planning and 
coordination, terrorist threats can be eliminated. 
 
1. Operation Black Thunder 
Prior to 1989, the Indian government’s two-pronged strategy of trying to strike 
political deals while increasing pressure through targeted police actions had led nowhere. 
On 4 March 1988, New Delhi released forty high-profile terrorists who, upon being 
released, walked directly into the Golden Temple complex. Shortly thereafter, the 
terrorists began to stockpile weapons and prepare defensive positions in and around the 
shrine. All indications suggested a repeat of the Bhindranwale-Bluestar crisis. 
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However, the Indian government was loath to repeat is Bluestar performance. For 
Operation Black Thunder, a detailed plan was established that coordinated the efforts of 
the military, elite forces, National Security Guard, and the Punjab police. An extensive 
communications network was established linking all parties to a tactical command post in 
Amritsar. Military leaders sealed the area and cut off electricity and water to the temple 
complex. The army stationed snipers at strategic points who fired at any movement 
within the temple. Rather than storming the temple, security forces used the strategy of 
wearing down the terrorists. After two weeks the perpetrators surrendered with minimal 
loss of life and very little damage to the Golden Temple complex. Unlike Bluestar, 
civilian leaders and security forces conducted Operation Black Thunder with great skill 
and efficacy.52 The complete ordeal was broadcast live to domestic and international 
media, thereby thwarting terrorist efforts to propagandize perceived military excesses and 
violations of the sanctity of the Golden Temple. 
Despite its success with Operation Black Thunder, terrorist attacks intensified 
leading up to 1992. Politicians, local police and their families, and even teachers were 
commonly targeted. Additionally terrorists stepped up their random attacks on large 
civilian gatherings in order to sow panic and undermine popular confidence in the 
government. During this period the terrorists, especially the Babbar Khalsas, turned 
increasingly to improvised explosive devices (IEDs), which were often detonated by 
remote control. Car bombs and roadside explosions occurred with alarming frequency 
and lethality.  
New Delhi took other important steps, many of them drastic, as part of its new 
counterterrorism strategy. But the greatest gains were realized by four key strategic 
modifications. Its first step was revitalizing the police force. Years of neglect, poor 
leadership and inexorable terrorist attacks had demoralized the Punjab Armed Police 
(PAP). In a bizarre incident in the town of Daheru, a PAP patrol encountered a small 
band of terrorists. Rather than pursue them, the PAP members dropped their weapons and 
fled. Punjabis often spoke of instances when the police summarily refused to leave their 
barricaded police stations. Their will to fight had been completely broken.53 
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The situation changed in 1989 when K. P. S. Gill was named the new Director 
General of the PAP and was given charge of counterterrorism operations in Punjab. Gill 
is credited with infusing a new sense of purpose and pride into the police organization. 
New police districts were created and over 26,000 new police officers were recruited.54 
Morale improved considerably with new welfare measures such as ex-gratia payments to 
the families of police officers killed in action. The police force responded quickly to the 
changes and the public’s confidence began to gradually increase. 
A second major change occurred by strengthening military and police 
cooperation. Previously there had been little if any coordination between the PAP, para-
military forces and the Indian army. However, changes to the joint structure resulted in 
unified command centers, tactical operations headquarters and shared communications 
networks. Radio coverage was extended to every police outpost and the PAP linked its 
communications with the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and the Border Security 
Force (BSF). All of these organizations were then networked into a unified command 
center. After 1992, great emphasis was placed on mutual support. Though the primary 
burden of counterterrorism operations fell on the PAP, army units could be requested 
quickly for backup. The army usually provided support by cordoning target areas 
allowing the PAP to effectively conduct counterterrorism sweeps and other associated 
“civic actions.”55 
India’s third strategic modification was the development of specialized 
counterterrorism training programs. The PAP and military units began incorporating new 
training plans that focused on hostage recovery, urban operations, building seizures, and 
other counterterrorism scenarios. This helped improve both their urban and rural 
operations and dramatically enhanced multi-service interoperability. Additionally, 
counterterrorism forces were given advanced weapons and personal protective 
equipment, which not only improved their fighting capability but also their morale. 
Bulletproof vehicles, light machine guns, two-inch mortars, hand grenades and self-
loading rifles became standard issue for each police sub-unit.  
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The fourth major change to India’s counterterrorism strategy was to adopt a “no-
negotiation” political approach. Great gains were made on the political front when New 
Delhi abandoned its efforts to negotiate with the disparate terrorist organizations. 
Previously as individual terrorist groups struck deals with the central government, others 
would increase their attacks and break down the accord. The Indian government also 
discovered that terrorist organizations repeatedly split and mutated into separate groups 
with unique demands. After New Delhi adopted a “no-negotiation” approach, more 
political energy was focused on the general population. This policy was not without 
critics who saw this a further evidence of New Delhi’s belligerent disregard for human 
rights. However, as the security situation began to improve, the Indian government 
skillfully encouraged new political parties, free and fair elections and other requisite 
democratic processes. The public began to feel that needed changes could be attained 
through political activism and not through violence. In 1992, when an election for the 
state assembly was announced, terrorists threatened to kill anyone who voted. Voter 
turnout was a dismal twenty-two percent. Less than a year later, in January 1993, village 
council elections saw an astounding eighty-two percent voter participation rate.56 The 
support base for the terrorist organizations rapidly began to crumble.  
 
F.  OUTCOME 
Terrorism in Punjab, despite ravaging the state for over a decade, was eradicated 
by sound counterterrorism strategy and coordinated implementation. Senior terrorist 
leaders from nearly every major organization were either captured or killed. The effect 
this had on casualties was remarkable. In 1991, 2,591 civilians were killed by terrorist 
attacks. By 1992 the number dropped to 1,518. In 1993, civilian deaths plummeted to 
only forty-eight. Sporadic violence continued until 1995 but since then, few terrorist 
attacks of consequence have been reported. The years 2001 and 2002 saw only one and 
five terrorist related deaths respectively. India had won its war on terrorism in Punjab. 
The Sikh separatist issue, however, has not completely disappeared. There are still 
proponents of an independent Khalistan. Many of the most vocal Khalistan leaders 
currently reside in England, Canada and the United States, and continue to press the 
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Khalistan issue as much as possible. In November 2003 the Council of Khalistan, based 
in Washington, D.C., held a large, pro-Khalistan seminar. At the meeting, Darshan Singh, 
an influential university professor, declared unequivocally that, “If a Sikh is not for 
Khalistan, he is not a Sikh.”57 The council then declared, “This is a step forward for the 
liberation of the Sikh nation. There is a new upsurge of support for the cause of Sikh 
freedom.”58 The fact that the Khalistan idea remains a goal for some opens the possibility 
to future Sikh violence. This is, nonetheless, very unlikely. India’s improving 
counterterrorism strategy sets a powerful precedence for peace and stability in Punjab for 
the foreseeable future.  
 
G.  RELEVANCE FOR U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY 
Though there are some key differences, the situation New Delhi faced in Punjab 
during the 1980s bears striking and important similarities with that facing U.S. forces 
involved in overseas operations like Iraq. For instance, in each example military forces 
that were culturally, linguistically, and religiously different than the terrorists and the 
local population were used, at least initially, to lead the counterterrorism effort. In Iraq 
these differences are much more pronounced but they were certainly a factor for the 
Indians in Punjab as well. Also, terrorist forces focused the bulk of their attacks on the 
police, local politicians and the general public. This characteristic is strikingly similar in 
both cases. Finally, both the U.S. and the Indian governments were directly responsible 
for the administration of the disturbed areas. For nearly seven years New Delhi managed 
Punjab under President’s Rule much like the Coalition Provisional Authority does Iraq. 
Though the size and scope of administering a state such as Punjab can barely compare 
with administering a foreign country, many of the challenges—ergo the solutions—are 
quite similar. 
 
1. Counterterrorism Lessons for U.S. International Actions 
India’s experience in Punjab has important implications for U.S. counterterrorism 
in foreign countries like Iraq and Afghanistan. First, U.S. administrators must redouble 
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efforts to stimulate social, political, and economic development in these regions. In 
Punjab, Indian political and military leaders faced growing discontent due in part to 
general under-development. Punjabis felt that New Delhi had overlooked the 
establishment of infrastructure, industry, and a viable political body in their homeland.59 
Social and political discontent created an excellent environment for the growth of 
terrorism in Punjab. 
This situation is similar to that in Iraq and Afghanistan. Failing or non-existent 
infrastructure, unreliable public services, and unemployment magnify latent anti-U.S. 
hostility and motivates anti-U.S. terrorism. New Delhi undertook various economic 
development packages that proved moderately successful in reducing terrorism in Punjab. 
India’s experience in Punjab demonstrates that a robust economic development plan, 
while not guaranteeing success against terrorism, significantly helps reduce public 
discontent and robs terrorists of popular support. 
India’s economic and social development tactic, however, could have been much 
more successful than it was. The programs were commonly halted due to periods of 
increased terrorist violence and/or aggressive military responses. This sputtering effort 
stunted real progress and eroded public confidence in both the specific economic plans 
and in the government’s sincerity itself. Also, allegations of corruption and poor planning 
at both the state and local levels limited the overall positive effect that New Delhi’s 
efforts could have achieved.60  
The U.S. government must carefully execute economic aid packages. Corruption 
and inefficiencies hinder the program’s goals by delaying construction plans, community 
development and other related activities. Additionally, public perceptions—true or 
false—of corruption may exasperate dissent and ultimately fuel more terrorism. Having 
an economic aid program will not guarantee peace. Yet a lack of an economic 
development plan in areas marred by terrorist violence virtually assures heightened 
public dissent and escalating terrorist attacks. 
Second, the U.S. government must dedicate ample time and energy to reducing 
the significant ethnic and religious undertones of the conflict. In Punjab, New Delhi faced 
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a situation that was marked by clear ethnic and religious divisions. Insurgent forces 
targeted those fault lines in an attempt to fracture the society. They nearly succeeded. 
However, by building on the long tradition of cultural interaction between Sikhs and 
Hindus, New Delhi was able to re-forge the broken communal links.  
Likewise, Iraq is easily divided along ethnic and religious lines. Sunni and Shi’i 
communities have a long history of animosity in Iraq marked by the former regime’s 
Sunni-dominated government, the Iran-Iraq war, and Shi’i uprisings throughout much of 
the country.61 There is a real possibility of anti-U.S. forces trying to exasperate those 
tensions. A civil war in Iraq over religion is perhaps the worst-case scenario for Coalition 
forces currently in country.  
Third, American forces must be trained, equipped, and prepared to conduct 
counterterrorism operations in urban environments. Punjab demonstrated that the most 
difficult and costly counterterrorism battles are often waged in heavily populated areas. 
This is for three reasons. First, terrorists can count on greater “invisibility” in areas of 
high population density. Second, terrorist attacks, which usually aim to kill as many 
people as possible, are more effective—from the terrorist’s point of view—in crowded 
urban centers. Third, security forces are often goaded into heavy-handed retaliations that 
may injure as many, if not more, people as the initial attack. Vijay Karan noted that 
inciting police retaliation was often the primary purpose of terrorist attacks in Punjab.62 
Repressive or extreme army reactions often served the terrorist’s purposes by promoting 
anti-government hostility and resentment. U.S. forces will continue to encounter this 
dilemma in Iraq and must prepare accordingly. 
Fourth, terrorism in foreign countries will not be eliminated by military force 
alone. Despite advanced weaponry, intensive training, and state-of-the-art technology, an 
effective local security apparatus is essential to defeating terrorism. The Indian army 
captured or killed innumerable Sikh terrorists. At various times Indian military forces 
turned Punjab into a veritable occupied territory. Yet the violence did not cease. 
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However, once the local security establishment began to operate effectively, great gains 
were made against the terrorists. 
Local security services must provide the majority of the counterterrorism effort. A 
demoralized police force that lacks the public’s confidence actually facilitates terrorism 
in many ways. For instance, terrorist groups in Punjab intimidated the local police to such 
a degree that the criminals achieved great freedom of movement and action. Also, as 
public confidence in the police waned, informants were increasingly hard to find, making 
the identification and prosecution of the terrorists nearly impossible. However, as local 
police became more capable, terrorist groups could no longer act with such impunity. 
Foreign military troops—be they from New Delhi or New York—can never defeat 
terrorism without the help of the local police and their intimate knowledge of the area and 
its people. 
Though local police are central to the counterterrorism effort, politicians and 
strategists must not view terrorism as merely a criminal problem. Though the rule of law 
and the respect of human rights must reign supreme, security forces at all levels must 
recognize that terrorism represents a threat to the very survival of the state that far 
exceeds common criminal activities. There must be an unwavering resolve to apprehend 
or eliminate the terrorists at every possible opportunity. Incrementally increasing pressure 
only guarantees a protracted struggle that affords terrorists time to adapt to government 
tactics, engender a popular perception as the “freedom fighter victim,” and export 
terrorist operations to new venues. 
The central role of police and local security agencies does not mean that regular 
military forces have no role in counterterrorism operations. To the contrary, military 
troops have much to offer. In Punjab, security forces made their greatest advances when 
local police and Indian troops cooperated to draw on each other’s respective strengths. 
For instance, India began a series of cordon-and-search operations in which the army 
would surround and seal-off an entire town—something the other security forces could 
not do effectively. The local and state police would then search target sites based on their 
knowledge of the citizenry and its unique situation—something the army could not do. 
These operations yielded tremendous success at capturing militants, seizing weapons, and 
increasing the pressure on the militants. Gill declared that by May 1989 the KLO, the 
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BTFK, and the Babbar Khalsa had all been reduced to a “negligible presence” adding 
further that, “Terrorism at this juncture could have been wiped out in the state of Punjab 
within another six months of sustained campaigning.”63  
Violent counterterrorism operations involving multiple security agencies often 
will be necessary. Operation Bluestar demonstrated that popular perceptions (e.g. that the 
Sikh Panth was indeed under a direct attack by Hindu forces) will polarize a society and 
provide tremendous political capital for the terrorist organizations. A direct U.S. assault 
on a mosque or Islamic holy site in Iraq a la Operation Bluestar is virtually 
inconceivable. However, other hard-hitting military actions, if not conducted with the 
utmost care, may produce similar results and would mark a serious, if not unrecoverable, 
deterioration of the United State’s position in the area. 
For American forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, the difficulties of rebuilding (or in 
some instances building from scratch) an effective local police force are formidable. 
Organization, training, logistics, and manpower issues present difficult challenges that 
cannot be resolved quickly. U.S. troops have, to their credit, achieved many remarkable 
successes in their counterterrorism operations, such as the capture of Saddam Hussein 
and many of his senior advisors. However, real advances in stopping terrorist violence 
will only be made by Iraqi security forces working in concert with their coalition 
partners.  
Fifth, the United States, and by extension the Coalition Provisional Authority 
(CPA), must not allow terrorist groups to participate in political negotiations in any form. 
India’s experience shows that there is rarely an end to peace talks with criminals. By 
doing so, terrorist organizations gain increased political legitimacy and can undermine 
the entire political process. Additionally, governments run the risk of actually spawning 
more terrorism once some groups gain political “victories” or government concessions 
through negotiations.64 Simultaneously, democratic institutions and processes should be 
encouraged giving the public a political outlet other than terrorist violence. 
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Finally, American counterterrorism strategy at the tactical and operational levels 
must continually focus on the general public’s perception of the terrorist problem. This is 
much more than a “hearts and minds” campaign or a PSYOP mission. There must be a 
concerted effort by government forces to help the population internalize the terrorism 
fight and adopt it as their own. The watershed change in Punjabi counterterrorism 
occurred when the terrorists began targeting the families of security personnel. Police 
resolve was redoubled and the public’s perception of the terrorist cause dramatically 
changed in the government’s favor. 
U.S. civil and military leaders in foreign counterterrorism campaigns must 
prepare methods to engage local populations and dissuade them from supporting 
insurgents. In both Punjab and Iraq the local population suffered devastating terrorist 
attacks that killed many more civilians than government forces. If Iraqi citizens, for 
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III. INSURGENCY IN INDIA’S NORTHEAST 
 
 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
India’s northeast region has been marred by terrorist violence for more than fifty 
years. New Delhi has employed many different policies to counter terrorism in the 
northeast including economic incentives, military intervention, amnesty programs for 
“reformed” terrorists, and political concessions. Despite countless counterterrorism 
strategies, the area still harbors over 104 terrorist and/or militant organizations and 
accounts for roughly one-third of all terrorist attacks in the nation.65 
This chapter establishes that the principal motivation for terrorism in India’s 
northeast is ethnic tension. Many of these groups feel culturally removed from the rest of 
India and consider New Delhi’s rule over the area unjust and illegitimate. Demands for 
self-rule and sovereign territory are common among the region’s ethnic groups and many 
of them have resorted to terror attacks in a bid for independence. New Delhi’s efforts to 
expand its political or military influence into the northeast are usually met with stiff 
opposition. Ethnic tensions also result in fierce inter-ethnic conflicts. The countless 
ethnicities and sub-national divisions have reinforced deep-seated animosities between 
the disparate groups. Illegal immigration from neighboring countries has exasperated 
many of these tensions by changing the demographics and bringing disparate groups into 
closer contact. At stake is much more than ethnic pride. Groups fight over lands that are 
often rich in oil or agricultural potential. Likewise, violence results from deliberate 
attempts to increase political influence, economic bargaining power, or social prestige. 
Increasingly, rights to illicit activities such as narcotics and weapons trafficking mark the 
cause of the much of the violence as some of the terrorist groups shed their original 
“ethnic” motivations to assume a more mafia-like appearance.  
This chapter also presents three key lessons for U.S. counterterrorism policy 
makers. First, economic stimulus plans, though important, will not end terrorism or ethnic 
strife in an area and may, if handled improperly, aggravate the problems. New Delhi has 
made large capital investments into the northeast. Some violent organizations, however, 
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view these plans as unfair aid to rival factions. Additionally, corruption siphons large 
amounts of money directly into the hands of militant organizations, facilitating weapons 
purchases, terrorist training efforts, and recruitment initiatives. 
Second, the case of terrorism in India’s northeast highlights the importance of 
effective border security. Terrorist organizations routinely exploit loose borders between 
India and neighboring countries by maintaining training and logistic centers beyond New 
Delhi’s reach. Sections of these borders are under almost complete control of terrorist 
groups who maintain their own border checkpoints to extort money for their activities. 
This has two important implications. Operating support bases beyond India’s territory 
significantly hinders New Delhi’s counterterrorism efforts in the northeast. Terrorists can 
cross into the northeastern states, attack largely at will, and then retreat to relative safety 
across the international border. Additionally, the transit of insurgent and terrorist groups 
helps spread ethnic violence and widens the affected areas. This is most clearly seen in 
Nagaland. The Naga insurgency began in India but quickly spread across the border with 
Myanmar, spurring ethnic Nagas there to support the violent campaigns. 
 The transit of terrorism in the northeast highlights the third vital lesson for U.S. 
counterterrorism efforts. Without effective international cooperation, there will be little 
permanent progress in the war on terrorism. Reductions in terrorist violence in the 
northeast correlate directly with improvements in cross-border counterterrorism 
cooperation.  
Numerous factors have debilitated India’s counterterrorism efforts and 
perpetuated the conflicts. Demographic diversity, ethnic and religious tensions, pervasive 
under-development, misperceptions about New Delhi’s interests, and ineffective 
democratic processes characterize most of the region and spawn continued violence. 
Nonetheless, there are recent signs of improvement. India has modified its strategy 
toward the region—modifications that have recently begun to bear fruit. While these 




B.  BACKGROUND 
The northeast region consists of seven states: Meghalaya, Assam, Arunachal 
Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur, Mizoram and Tripura.  
 













Each state is currently experiencing varying levels of terrorist and insurgent violence. 
However, terrorism is most severe in Nagaland, Assam and Tripura. These three states 
are excellent examples of terrorism in India because the most organized, experienced and 
active terrorist groups routinely operate there. Some of these terrorist movements, such as 
that for Naga independence, benefit from over fifty years of experience, making their 
efforts to organize, equip, and attack notably more effective. Figure 2 shows how this 
activity has produced, in the last decade, significant periods of escalating fatalities with 
only Nagaland demonstrating a noteworthy decline.66  
Further, terrorism in each state is unique—spurred on by different (and 
occasionally competing) factors that require distinct counterterrorism tactics. Ethnic 
separatism is the most prevalent motivation for terrorism in the northeast. Groups such as 
the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCM) actively strive for the creation of an 
independent Naga nation. Other groups, such as the All-Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF) are 
motivated by ethnic and tribal rivalries. Socialist politics and religion are other significant 
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motivating forces. Finally, foreign intervention encourages many terrorist groups in 
India’s northeast. In the 1990s, the Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI) 
allegedly made contact with insurgent groups in the northeast. 
 
 























Confessional statements made by captured terrorists indicate that the ISI wanted the 
insurgent forces to open a second front of subversion in the northeast to compliment the 
one in Kashmir.67 The ISI’s links to Indian terrorism is further explored in subsequent 
chapters but the mere allegation of ISI activity in the northeast is enough to prompt some 
terrorist attacks. However, many groups have exchanged their social, political, religious, 
and ideological motivations for lucrative criminal activities such as drug trafficking, 
kidnappings for ransom, extortion, and weapons sales. 
Despite the differences between terrorism in the three states, important 
commonalities bear noting. The region as a whole faces numerous collective challenges, 
such as ethnic diversity, economic instability and geographic limitations. Understanding 
how these common characteristics impact terrorism in the northeast is critical to 
developing a viable counterterrorism strategy. 
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1. Ethnic Diversity 
 Northeast India is quite diverse, both ethnically and culturally. The plethora of 
religions, languages, and tribal identities separates populations more concretely than a 
state boundary could ever do. The Indian Constitution recognizes over 160 separate tribes 
in the area. However, according to a noted expert on terrorism in India’s northeast, Ajai 
Sahni, this does not accurately reflect the real complexity of ethnic variance in the region, 
which consists of over 400 distinct tribal or sub-tribal groups.68 Yet some inhabitants are 
not affiliated with any particular tribe. Tribal residents dominate in some states, such as 
in Manipur and Nagaland but constitute a significant minority in states such as Tripura 
and Assam.69 This further complicates the ethnic equation in the region, exasperating the 
already-stressed ethnic divisions.  
 
2. Economic Instability 
Economic hardship is pervasive in India’s northeast. Nagaland, Assam and 
Tripura are all below India’s national per capita average. There is little industry, virtually 
no service sector and the rampant instability discourages external investments. There is, 
however, a great deal of money flowing into the northeast region. India’s central 
government has allocated sizable grants administered by the Department of the North 
Eastern Region (DONER). Last year DONER operated on a $122 million budget.70 
Additional funding comes from the North Eastern Council with its $111 million budget. 
The World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) have also sent money into the 
northeast. Recently the ADB approved a major development project for the area 
projected at $444 million.71  
But the influx of capital has not stopped the violence and in some instances, may 
be exasperating the problems of corruption, graft, and extortion. According to C. P. 
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Thakur, the Minister of DONER, nearly ten percent of developmental funding goes 
directly to the coffers of the militants.72 Terrorism further depresses the region’s stagnant 
economy. In the last two years, terrorist attacks have prevented the extension of railroads, 
burnt down bridges and targeted businesses and their leaders, greatly hindering the 
government’s peace initiatives. 
 
3. Geographic Challenges 
Geography poses another challenge to stability in the area. India’s northeast 
covers over 98,000 square miles and accounts for nearly forty million people. The region 
has, for centuries, been a key area for the exchange of people, goods and ideas from 
India’s interior to both East Asia and Southeast Asia.73 The creation of East Pakistan in 
1947 proved to be a major blow to the northeast as it abruptly cut roads and railways that 
were sustaining local populations.74 It also blocked access to the Chittagong port in the 
Bay of Bengal, which further isolated the seven states, and Tripura in particular. Partition 
nearly severed the northeast region from India if not for the Shiliguri Corridor 
(commonly referred to as the “Chicken’s Neck”), a narrow strip of land that averages 
only fifteen miles wide. This has intensified feelings of geographic isolation and inflamed 
separatist sentiments in the region. 
Border problems are another aspect of geographic challenges common in the 
region. The states are located between Bhutan, China, Myanmar and Bangladesh, 
creating over 2,000 miles of dense jungle borders to secure—a virtually impossible task. 
This permeability is most significant along the borders with Bangladesh and Myanmar, 
from whence much of India’s illegal immigration springs. Approximately 20 million 
illegal Bangladeshis live in India, many having crossed the poorly delineated and loosely 
patrolled international border.75 
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The ease of transit from neighboring countries into India’s northeast has dire 
implications for counterterrorism efforts. Various terrorist groups have established 
training camps and supply depots in nearby countries and exploit the easy border 
crossings. The highly publicized seizure of ammunition in Bogra, Bangladesh was a 
telling example. On 27 June 2003 Bangladeshi police seized over 160,000 rounds of 
Chinese rifle bullets and 700 lbs of RDX plastic explosive—the largest single 
ammunition seizure since the establishment of Bangladesh.76 Initial reports suggest the 
weapons were to be smuggled across the border to Tripura to support terrorist operations 
there. Subsequent police raids have implicated members of the Jama'at-i Islami (JI) of 
Pakistan and the Jama'at-i Islami of Bangladesh (JIB). Long, loosely guarded borders 
make impeding transnational terrorism significantly harder in India’s northeast.  
The cases of Assam, Nagaland, and Tripura are vital to understanding terrorism in 
India’s northeast. These examples show the most significant characteristics of the 
problem; its roots, its organizations, and its manifestations. This chapter presents each 
state’s primary terrorist challenge, the Indian government’s counterterrorism efforts, and 
how New Delhi’s lackluster response to terrorism provides important lessons for U.S. 
counterterrorism policy makers.  
 
C.  ASSAM 
1. Background 
Assam is the most violence-stricken state in northeast India. Its central location 
creates shared borders with each of the other six states and internationally with 
Bangladesh and Bhutan. Additionally, Assam is the primary corridor that connects the 
northeastern region with the rest of India. The resulting flow of people and goods through 
Assam makes it vital to political, economic and military security for the entire area. It 
also makes Assam a prime target for terrorist strikes and related criminal activities. 
  
2. Conflict Dynamics 
Secessionist movements and ethnic rivalries are the two primary engines of 
terrorism and insurgency in Assam. Terror attacks began as an attempt to deter illegal 
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immigration, which was radically changing the state’s traditional demography. Amid 
rising discord, anti-immigration groups emerged and by 1979 were formally organized. 
That year, the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) was founded and remains the 
most recognized and prolific terrorist organization in the state, if not the region.77 At its 
pinnacle ULFA created pervasive terror throughout the state through increasingly violent 
attacks conducted with relative impunity. The preeminence of the ULFA to terrorism in 
the region must not be under stressed.  
ULFA believes that Assam was historically independent from India. According to 
the group, even after India’s independence in 1947, the territory of Assam remained 
geographically separate, having never been included in the country’s original charter. 
ULFA contends that Assam should be independent and self-governing, being both 
geographically separate and ethnically distinct from India. New Delhi heightened local 
anxieties and anti-India sentiments when it loosened laws on the migration of foreigners 
to Assam. Predictably this led to a dramatic rise in immigration, both legal and illegal, 
from neighboring Bangladesh. According to the ULFA, this destroyed Assam’s distinct 
ethnic character.78 ULFA then adopted an extreme version of Maoist-Marxist socialism, 
which served as the ideological foundation for its terrorist attacks. As one ULFA 
publication explains, “to create an exploitation-free society our next step must be a 
national war of liberation…we have no alternative to armed revolution.”79 ULFA’s vice-
chairman Pradip Gogoi, further clarified his organization’s objectives when he reiterated 
the group’s demand for a “sovereign, socialist Assam” in which, “All indigenous people 
must stay, all others must leave.”80 
ULFA remained closely allied to various socialist groups and anti-immigration 
parties throughout most of the 1980s and 1990s. In recent years, however, the state and 
federal governments have made advances on the issue of immigration.81 As a result, some 
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of ULFA’s old political allies have since denounced the group, its leaders, and its 
tactics—isolating the group and enabling the capture of many prominent ULFA leaders, 
including Gogoi. Surprisingly, ULFA then adopted an even more “hard-line” ideology 
and a more ruthless modus operandi. ULFA’s leadership continues its calls for the 
secession of Assam from India and turns increasingly to bombings, kidnappings and 
political assassinations to advance their cause. 
Secessionism and ethnic conflicts are also key to the Bodo movement, Assam’s 
second most significant source of terrorism. Bodos are one of the most prominent tribes 
in Assam and are very distinct culturally and ethnically from the Assamese. The 
animosity between the two groups is well documented. For this, many Bodos began 
demanding an independent Bodo nation to further their rights. Though many 
organizations claim to be the legitimate voice of the Bodo people, the National 
Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) emerged as the most prominent in 1988. 
Much like ULFA violence, Bodo violence in Assam reached its peak during the 
late 1980s. Though routinely eclipsed by ULFA and commonly relegated to “second 
place” among Assam’s terrorist organizations, the NDFB has recently gained ground. In 
the last two years, the NDFB has acquired significant prominence and now captures an 
equal share of India’s counterterrorism limelight. 
Terrorist groups in Assam owe their survival to international connections. ULFA 
was the first group to set up training camps in Bhutan and reportedly has nearly 2,000 
personnel encamped there.82 These facilities serve as training centers, weapons depots, 
planning facilities and operational headquarters for their terrorist attacks. Unlike 
Bangladesh, which vehemently denies that any terrorist training facilities exist in its 
territory, Bhutan openly admits that the camps exist. Though there is discrepancy over 
quantity (the Indian government believes that Bhutan harbors over thirty terrorist camps 
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while the Bhutanese government maintains that there are only nine) both sides agree that 
they do in fact exist and that they pose a threat to peace and stability.83  
 ULFA and the NDFB are only two of many terrorist groups operating in Assam. 
Other prominent groups include the Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT), the Gorkha Tiger 
Force (GTF), the Kamatapur Liberation Organization (KLO), the Bengali Tiger Force 
(BTF), and the People’s United Liberation Front (PULF). Nearly all of the organizations 
are driven by secessionism, socialism, and/or ethnic tensions. 
 Trends indicate that terrorist violence in Assam is worsening. Over the last decade 
the state has experienced a dramatic increase in the quantity and lethality of terrorists 
strikes. ULFA and NDFB cadres are well trained, well armed, and consistently 
demonstrate their ability to carry out intricate operations far from their training and 
logistic centers with relative impunity. Despite a slight decline in terrorism fatalities over 
the last three years, Assam still averages nearly 40 deaths a month.84  Barring a major 
breakthrough, terrorism will likely remain prominent in Assam for the foreseeable future. 
 
D.  TRIPURA  
1. Background 
Tripura is the smallest state in India’s northeast. Its relatively small population 
(three million) in an area of 4,000 square miles makes it one of the least inhabited states 
in India.85 Also, Tripura is nearly surrounded by Bangladesh—roughly eighty percent of 
its borders are international.86 This has dramatically changed the state’s ethnic and tribal 
concentrations. 
Consequently, terrorism in Tripura is primarily based on nationalism. Tripura is 
home to many distinct tribes that, as in other parts of the region, differ widely from one 
another ethnically, linguistically, culturally and often religiously. Tripura’s demographics 
changed more than any other northeastern state during and immediately following the 
creation of East Pakistan in 1947. Though exact figures are unavailable, conservative 
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estimates suggest that Tripura’s tribal population, which at one time accounted for nearly 
all the state’s population, dropped to only twenty-eight percent following the waves of 
immigration.87  
This dramatic change exasperated ethnic tensions, which by the late 1970s had 
reached a critical point. Various Tripura tribes united and secretly established the Tripura 
National Volunteers (TNV), chartered to defend tribal rights and property from the 
encroaching non-tribal influence. The immigrant Bengali population responded by 
forming their own organization known as the Amra Bangla (“We are Bengalis”) and the 
two camps were poised for conflict. Violence erupted in 1979 as ethnic riots prompted 
attacks and retaliations from both sides. Reports indicate that as many as 1,800 people 
were killed before peace was restored in late 1980.88  
Compounding the problem is the popular perception that the ruling Left Front is 
decidedly pro-Bengali and anti-Tripurese. The Left Front is often accused of encouraging 
illegal Bengali immigration. This allegation is one of the primary motivations for 
militancy in the State and is often exploited by the terrorist organizations.89 This 
perception has multiple implications as it drives the Tripurese to expel immigrants who, 
in turn, seek to protect their own interests.  
Despite its small size, Tripura consistently suffers a disproportionately high 
number of terrorist attacks and deaths. Though the years 2000-2002 saw modest declines, 
fatalities nearly doubled to 276 by 23 November 2003.90  This data, when viewed against 
Tripura’s small population, demonstrates the area’s propensity for terrorist violence. 
 
2. Conflict Dynamics 
There are two principal terrorist groups in Tripura. The first and most significant 
is the National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT). The NLFT was established on 12 
March 1989 after its predecessor, the TNV, agreed with the government to disband. The 
NLFT has been particularly active during the last two years and is believed to have 
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approximately 825 members.91 However, the NLFT has splintered along ideological and 
strategic fault lines. One of the most significant divisions affecting the NLFT is religion. 
Hindu members side with their leader, Nayanbashi Jamatia, while Christians follow 
Biswamohan Debbarma. Neither of the resulting camps is significant enough on its own 
to become the preeminent voice of Tripura’s insurgents, but the case demonstrates how 
organizations like the NLFT are often rife with social and political divisions. 
 Despite its divisions, the NLFT as a whole has remained a viable terrorist force. 
The group relies heavily on its ties to nearby countries such as Bangladesh and Myanmar 
for training and supplies. The NLFT has at least 25 training camps in Bangladesh and 
uses them to launch attacks into Tripura—retreating across the border once their missions 
are complete. Poor cooperation between Indian security forces and those in neighboring 
countries has handicapped counterterrorism efforts in Tripura. In 2002, the NLFT 
accounted for eighty percent of all terrorist fatalities statewide and their operations in 
2003 remained equally as prolific.  
  Tripura’s second major terrorist organization is the All Tripura Tiger Force 
(ATTF). Some NLFT members see the ATTF as competition and the two groups are 
often in direct conflict. Rivalry between the two groups contributes to feelings of “one-
upsmanship” with the two groups often acting in succession in a perverse attempt to out-
do their rival’s latest attack. The ATTF seeks to expel immigrants (primarily 
Bangladeshis) who now comprise nearly thirty-three percent of the state’s population.92  
Like their rivals, the ATTF has heavily exploited international borders, establishing 
approximately twenty training camps in Bangladesh. 
 
E.  NAGALAND 
1. Background 
Nagaland represents India's longest and most enduring terrorist challenge. The 
Nagas are an indigenous population of approximately four million people that differ 
significantly from other Indians ethnically, religiously, linguistically and culturally. 
Nagas are concentrated primarily in Nagaland though nearly two million live in the 
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neighboring states of Arunachal Pradesh, Assam and Manipur with another million living 
across the Myanmar border.  
Seeking independence and sovereignty, the Nagas have used violence since the 
earliest days of British influence in the region. On 14 August 1947, one day prior to 
India's formal declaration of independence from England, the Naga National Council 
(NNC) declared its own independence from India. Under the leadership of Zapu Phizo a 
Naga government was created in exile and began mobilizing a Naga resistance. However, 
the situation was complicated by the fact that intra-tribal differences split the Naga 
population between those that favored and those that opposed integration with India's 
emerging central government. Persistent fractures along ethnic and political divides has 
characterized the Naga resistance ever since. 
From 1952-1963 Indian security forces launched counter-insurgency operations 
against Naga rebels in which over 200,000 Nagas were reportedly killed.93 In an attempt 
to placate the Naga insurgency, the Indian government signed the “Delhi Agreement” in 
1963. This fiercely criticized accord granted statehood to Nagaland and offered major 
political and economic concessions to the Naga leaders. This lent legitimacy to the state 
government and helped marginalize the insurgents. Terrorist attacks, however, continued 
unabated despite various failed peace agreements and in 1967 the Indian government’s 
Peace Mission to Nagaland was officially abandoned. Predictably, few positive 
developments resulted during these years. 
In 1972 the NNC was outlawed under the Unlawful Activities Act of 1967 and 
New Delhi returned to its policy of aggressive military intervention. After three years, a 
tenuous peace was restored with the signing of the Shillong Accord. Yet many Nagas 
summarily rejected the accord and refused to surrender, forming instead a new insurgent 
movement called the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (NSCN). Founded by two 
charismatic leaders, Isak Chisi Swu and Thuingaleng Muivah, the NSCN rapidly 
emerged as the preeminent terrorist force in Nagaland.  
 The NSCN continued the NNC’s efforts to establish an independent Naga nation. 
In theory the nation, known as “Nagalim,” would unite the thirty-seven disparate Naga 
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tribes into a greater Naga populace. Drawing heavily from Mao Zedong’s violent 
socialism, the NSCN set about to liberate Nagas from the perceived social and economic 
oppression by non-Nagas. The primary targets of Naga violence were members of the 
Kuki tribe, who also resided in the region. Kukis naturally formed violent anti-Naga 
groups, but these paled in comparison to the NSCN. The NSCN benefited from the 
NNC’s popular support and grew rapidly, extending its influence throughout most of the 
state of Nagaland and into Assam, Manipur and Arunachal Pradesh. However, its 
widespread popularity was short-lived.  
By 1980 popular support for the NSCN waned. Many people felt estranged from 
the exiled government and quickly tired of gunpoint taxation by guerrilla forces. In an 
effort to shore up popular support, Naga leaders proclaimed the establishment of the 
People’s Republic of Nagaland, complete with a government, employees and a national 
military. However, as with many other terrorist groups, fissures and divisions plagued the 
NSCN. In 1988 the NSCN split over tribal, political and economic differences. The larger 
and more influential faction became know as the NSCN-IM after its leaders (“Isak-
Muivah”) while the rival faction became the NSCN-K for its founder S.S. Khaplang. 
Currently, both organizations continue a deep-seated animosity, often targeting each 
other in bitter internecine attacks. 
 Religion is an important aspect of the Naga independence movement. One of the 
most fascinating aspects of the Naga issue is its spiritual component. Though terrorism in 
Nagaland is not motivated by religious differences per se as is the case in other parts of 
India, the impact of religious discord on the issue is startling.  
Unlike the rest of India, Nagaland is nearly ninety percent Christian. Christianity 
first came to the area in 1892 when Dr. E. W. Clark, a Baptist missionary, began to 
proselytize to the Nagas in nearby Manipur. He later translated sections of the New 
Testament into local tribal dialects and to this day is revered in Naga society.  
Christianity spread rapidly. In 1972 the American evangelical preacher Billy 
Graham led a three-day spiritual revival in Nagaland to a crowd of over 500,000—more 
than half of the entire population at the time. According to the American Baptist Mission 
Center, Nagaland is now the most Baptist region of the world, and icons of this religiosity 
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abound. Plastic crosses are sold in nearly every gas station and "Praise the Lord" 
billboards dot the highways.  
Religious distinctiveness is not lost on Nagaland’s political and military leaders 
who emphasize the religious component of their complaint with Delhi. The NSCM-IM’s 
Isak Swu consistently emphasizes God in his political speeches, beginning them with the 
phrase "praise the Lord." His speeches often sound more like evangelical Sunday 
sermons than political discourse. While addressing the Naga nation on its nineteenth 
Republic Day Swu said,  
It is our sin alone that can defeat us, nothing else. It is, therefore, 
mandatory that we repent for our iniquities and go back to the Lord in 
humble submission. The Creator surely has a purpose for the Naga Nation. 
He wants us to live for Him and His Nagalim.94  
 
In other occasions Swu has incited popular sentiments by suggesting that Naga Christians 
were under attack by adherents of other faiths, specifying primarily Hindus and 
Muslims.95 Religion wields great influence on the scope and direction of terrorism in 
Nagaland.  
 
2. Conflict Dynamics 
The Naga militancy has experienced significant changes in its scope and 
direction. At its inception the Naga resistance was a traditional guerrilla war with “hit-
and-run” attacks on Indian military forces. As New Delhi increased military deployments 
to the area, the Naga resistance began to change its focus to mobilizing the civilian 
population. Additionally, Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) agency has actively 
sought to propagate terrorism in the northeast. However, modern militancy in Nagaland 
comes predominantly from internecine violence between the two NSCN factions. NSCN-
IM controls the southern sections of the state while their rivals dominate in the north. The 
two factions now attack each other as much as they attack Indian forces—marking a 
dramatic shift from traditional “guerrilla” attacks to more indiscriminate acts of terrorism.  
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 Unquestionably the NSCN-IM is the most prominent terrorist organization in 
Nagaland. Both Muivah and Swu routinely espouse violence in the pursuit of “Greater 
Nagalim.” To the NSCN-IM, Nagalim encompasses all of present-day Nagaland and also 
consists of significant portions of Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur and even 
Myanmar. Calls for an independent Nagalim that encroaches on so many neighboring 
areas has prompted vociferous denouncements from nearly every other interested party. 96 
 In contrast, the NSCM-K has attempted to garnish popular support away from the 
NSCM-IM by endorsing Indian government demands to constrain Nagaland to its 
present-day borders. Some see this as a de-facto abandonment of the “Greater Nagalim” 
concept and Khaplang has been severely criticized as having been co-opted by New 
Delhi.  
 Violence in Nagaland is on the decline. For the last three years the state has 
averaged approximately one hundred terrorist deaths per year, which is down from 360 in 
1997.97 A very tenuous cease-fire agreement has lasted since 1998 despite terrorist 
attacks and state retaliations. However, on-going negotiations between the government 
and the various terrorist organizations have produced few tangible results.  
 
F.  INDIAN GOVERNMENT RESPONSE 
The Indian government has tried numerous political and military tactics to end the 
violence in the northeast. It has granted legal concessions, economic aid packages, 
political recognition and cease-fire deals to the various terrorist organizations. It has also 
used a variety of military and para-military options to wage its war on terrorism in the 
area. Neither tactic holds the definitive solution, as both are fraught with specific 
limitations and unintended consequences. All parties declare that the problems are 
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inherently political in nature and thus require political solutions. However, the military 
component to New Delhi’s counterterrorism strategy is worth noting. 
 
1. Military Response 
Indian military and para-military forces have been actively pursuing terrorists in 
India’s northeast for many years. Recent military intervention became most prevalent in 
1990 with the deployment of regular Indian army troops to Assam. Following the 
escalating violence of the late 1980s, India’s Union Minister of State and Home Affairs, 
Subodh Kant Sahay, said “The whole (Assam state government’s) machinery was with 
the ULFA.”98 The worsening security situation prompted the Indian government to 
summarily dismiss the state’s leadership on 27 November 1990, declare martial law, 
officially outlaw the ULFA, and commence a series of aggressive counterterrorist 
ventures with the most intensive named “Operation Bajrang” and “Operation Rhino.” 
Operations Bajrang and Rhino were massive military endeavors. In addition to 
local police and Indian army regulars, New Delhi drew on the Central Reserve Police 
Force (CRPF), the Border Security Force (BSF) and the Assam Rifles, a paramilitary 
force controlled by New Delhi. Nearly 30,000 army personnel (of the second and twenty-
first divisions) were reportedly utilized for Operation Bajrang and 40,000 (from the 
second, fourth, twenty-first, and fifty-seventh divisions) for Operation Rhino.99 
Additionally, the Indian Air Force’s (IAF) Eastern Air Command flew tactical support 
sorties and reconnaissance missions and, according to the IAF, helped discover ULFA 
mass graves.100 
Tactically, Bajrang and Rhino were successes. Indian military forces destroyed 
the ULFA’s headquarter in Lakhipathar and raided numerous ULFA safe houses. 
Saraipung, another ULFA camp capable of training 200 recruits, was overrun and 
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dismantled.101 Though by one count only fifteen ULFA members were killed, nearly 
7,000 were allegedly arrested.102 These numbers, of course, are somewhat suspect and not 
verifiable. However, the missions were certainly detrimental to the ULFA. As ULFA 
supporters were removed, the state saw a moderate decline in ULFA attacks, which gave 
Assam’s newly sworn-in government of Hiteswar Saikia a vital boost.  
However, strategically Operation Bajrang may have ultimately benefited the 
ULFA. The Indian military was unable to seal Assam’s borders in conjunction with its 
prosecution of ULFA terrorists, which allowed many, including some of ULFA’s most 
senior leaders to flee to neighboring Bhutan. This cut a new international facet into the 
military’s fight against terrorist and immensely complicated India’s counter-terrorist 
efforts in the area. 
A major impediment to Indian military operations in the northeast was the 
abundance of disparate forces involved. At any particular time Indian army troops, 
paramilitary forces, special police units, regular law enforcement agencies and even 
armed civilians could be fighting insurgents. Quite expectedly, efforts were often 
frustrated by confusion, competition and even interference. To help remedy this problem, 
a loose and rather ineffective coalition was formed in 1991 consisting of military, 
paramilitary and police forces. The resulting Central Command Coordination Center 
embodied the first attempt to coordinate a multi-pronged attack on terrorists. Though 
sound in principle, the plan failed to overcome the inherent problems of multi-force 
cooperation and it was supplanted in 1997 by a second, more ambitious effort.  
On 4 January 1997, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) directed the creation of 
the Unified Headquarters under which all counterterrorist activities would be 
coordinated. The Indian Army assumed operational control under the General Officer 
Commanding (GOC) of the Army’s IV Corps, which ultimately proved very 
controversial. Many dissident voices decried the move as the death of the democratically 
elected civilian government of the state. Only three weeks after its inception, a group of 
prominent residents publicly protested the new organization declaring that, “the 
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introduction of the Unified Command Structure when an elected government is in power 
would lead to a destruction of the democratic system in the state.”103 Though those fears 
are not likely to materialize, they demonstrate popular perceptions of the injection of the 
central government in northeastern states. Additionally, placing the Indian Army in 
control was a demoralizing blow to the state police who greatly resented the Army’s 
prominence and authority.104 
Police infrastructure in the region lacked cohesion and direction, often 
compromising its ability to maintain law and order. Various internal studies identified the 
problem and recommended solutions.105 In July 1978 the Indian government created a 
nucleus training initiative called the North East Police Academy (NEPA). NEPA’s 
creation was a watershed event in India’s counterterrorism program because it marked the 
first concerted effort to create an effective and coordinated security force in the region. 
However, the initiative remained relatively ineffective due to chronic under funding—
operating on only $62,000 a year from 1978 to 1986.  
In 1987 New Delhi made significant changes to its approach to the NEPA, 
resulting in dramatic budget increases. Figure 3 charts the relative increase in NEPA 
funding.  
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That year, NEPA’s funding skyrocketed to $926,667, then $1.9 million in 1988, $2.5 
million in 1992, $3 million in 1995 and $4 million today. Additionally, drastic changes to 
the training regime have increased emphasis on the judicious use of force, countering 
heavily armed opposition, conducting urban operations, and joint and inter-agency 
operations.106  
Consequently, cooperation between federal, state and even international units is 
on the rise. The previously mentioned ammunition seizure in Bangladesh resulted from 
detailed coordination involving state police, Indian border security forces, regular 
military units and close interaction with Bangladeshi police, who actually conducted the 
confiscation. Reports indicate the weapons confiscated in Bogra were being smuggled to 
support the All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF) and illustrate the cross-border nature of 
insurgency in the region.107 The weapons seizure also demonstrates how well-armed 
these factions are and how counterterrorism cooperation at all levels—local, federal, and 
international—is becoming increasingly essential to successfully countering terrorist 
threats. 
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Counterterrorist military operations in northeast India are an integral part of 
India’s overall strategy. They have, at times, eliminated terrorist cadres either by killing 
or capturing them and have successfully begun the process of integrated, multi-agency 
actions. However, military force has occasionally been misapplied, resulting in 
heightened anti-government feelings and increased sympathy for the insurgents. India 
must, therefore delicately balance the needs for state security with full respect for human 
rights. It becomes evident, therefore, that military force alone will not solve the problem. 
 
2. Political and Economic Response 
New Delhi’s political and economic response to terrorism in the northeast has 
been lackluster at best. Federal policies regarding insurgent organizations are bipolar—at 
once vilifying the terrorist groups as murderous criminals yet warmly receiving them at 
negotiation tables. The government’s ineffective political plans have done as much to 
perpetuate terrorism as they have to end it. The Indian Administrative Service (IAS), in 
its study titled “Understanding Ethnic Unrest in Indian Periphery—1994,” conceded that 
political parties are fuelling ethnic unrest in the northeast. The paper concluded that there 
are three key failures of India’s political response to terrorism. First, politics in the 
northeast was dominated by the manipulation of ethnic symbols and emotions. Second, 
the federal government has frequently imposed martial law and has thus reinforced its 
“imperialist image.” Third, political leaders have failed to establish emotional ties with 
the historically isolated population.108 Terrorist groups have capitalized on these political 
shortcomings, greatly restricting counterterrorism progress in the region. 
Ceasefire agreements have been one of the primary political tools employed by 
the Indian government in the region. The most successful example of this was the general 
ceasefire signed with the NSCN-IM in 1997. That agreement was initially to last one year 
and has been reestablished every year since. 
However, many issues complicate ceasefire negotiations. First, there are no 
guarantees that a ceasefire agreement will end the violence. Nagaland saw decreases in 
civilian deaths following the 1997 ceasefire, but the state still averages approximately 25 
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civilians killed per year.109 Terrorist organizations often use the hiatus of a ceasefire to 
re-arm and re-group their organization—breaking the peace at a time and place of their 
convenience and choosing. 
A second problem with negotiated ceasefires is the plethora of parties involved. 
The Indian government currently must negotiate separate agreements with each disparate 
group. New Delhi finalized a set of new ceasefire regulations with the NSCN-IM on 13 
January 2001 but was forced to sign a separate agreement with the NSCN-K in April of 
that same year. 
Ceasefire agreements also have unintended consequences that are often very 
difficult to predict, much less control. It is widely accepted that terrorist organizations in 
India’s Northeast use ceasefires as an opportunity to re-arm, re-finance and re-organize. 
Both the NSCN-IM and the NSCN-K have been very active, ceasefire not withstanding, 
in extorting money from private citizens, government officials and commercial 
enterprises. According to news reports, Oil India Limited, Coal India Limited and India’s 
Oil and Natural Gas Commission (ONGC) have all been targets of NSCN extortions 
during ceasefire times.110 Additionally, the cease-fire has failed to stop the flow of 
weapons to the NSCN-IM. When its Information and Publicity Wing office in Kohima 
was raided by government forces on 29 March 2001, stockpiles of new weapons, 
ammunition and extortion letters were confiscated.111 
Other unintended consequences abound. In June 2001 New Delhi attempted to 
capitalize on its previous gains by expanding the scope of its ceasefire with the NSCN-
IM. Following successful negotiations in Bangkok, Indian officials extended an olive 
branch to all Nagas “without territorial limits.” This was a significant and tangible 
concession on the part of the Indian government meant to prove Delhi’s sincere interest 
in a negotiated peace. Violence erupted in a very unexpected fashion. Nagaland’s 
neighboring states interpreted this concession as a step toward the establishment of 
“Greater Nagalim” which would infringe directly on their territorial integrity. Violent 
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protests erupted in Assam, Arunachal Pradesh and most tragically in Manipur where 
nineteen people were killed. 
Delhi was trapped. NSCN-IM leaders promised to denounce the cease-fire and 
resume their terrorist attacks if the territorial limits were re-instated. However, the anti-
Naga street violence was escalating out of control. On 8 July 2001, after only three 
weeks, the government rescinded its previous decree and reinstated the territorial 
limitations.112 Fortunately the violence promised by the NSCN-IM never materialized. 
Nonetheless, it remains a potent example of the inherent problems of negotiated 
settlements and cease-fire accords. 
The Indian government also used partisan methods by enticing terrorist members 
to leave their groups, denounce violence and re-join “mainstream” society. The most 
prevalent example of this was the concerted effort by the government to undermine the 
ULFA in Assam by paying for the surrender of ULFA cadres. The effort has generally 
been a very expensive failure. 
New Delhi has also capitulated to terrorists to buy short-term gains. For instance, 
it has released prisoners to secure the freedom of hostages. Generally India has vacillated 
between divergent political strategies—sometimes adopting a “no-negotiation” posture 
while at other times meeting terrorist demands. In 1991, Hiteswar Saikia, then the chief 
minister of Assam, agreed to a hostage-for-prisoner swap with the ULFA. Eleven ULFA 
members were released to secure the freedom of fourteen hostages that had been taken 
two weeks prior. The newly liberated ULFA members were then given safe passage to 
Bangladesh with a mandate to convince ULFA leaders there to renounce violence. 
Instead of preaching peace, however, the liberated ULFA members issued a joint 
statement denouncing the state government and calling for new waves of terror 
throughout Assam.113 
Despite failures such as this, the Indian government has not categorically 
denounced striking deals with terrorists. Instead it seeks to develop a political 
environment that allows it to either accept or reject terrorist negotiations at will. This, in 
principle, creates strategic ambiguity, allowing the government freedom of action while 
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constantly casting doubt over the terrorists and hostage takers. In practice, however, this 
posture may actually promote terrorist actions in the hope that the government may strike 
a deal. 
Finally, India’s counterterrorism efforts in the northeast demonstrate the need for 
effective communication and coordination between agencies. The Indian army, para-
military forces, state police and national intelligence services must establish clearly 
defined roles and must seek ways of improving cooperation and mutual support. Petty 
competition and inter-agency “turf wars” distract from the ultimate goal and greatly 
inhibit effective mission execution. According to Wasbir Hussain, there have been 
“innumerable instances” in the northeast when multiple forces have tried to claim credit 
for a counter-insurgency operation, creating “unhealthy competition that has been the 
hallmark of inter-force relations.”114  As Indian forces can better coordinate their efforts, 
terrorist organizations will enjoy significantly less freedom of action and shrinking areas 
of control. 
 
G.  OUTCOME 
 Despite New Delhi’s efforts, terrorist organizations thrive in the northeast. The 
combination of poverty, profound ethnic differences, extreme political camps, religious 
manipulation and geographical isolation helps perpetuate the belief among some that 
militancy is the best solution. Vijay Karan observed that, “So irresistible are the 
mercenary attractions that militancy is not infrequently taken up as a career, despite the 
risks involved and the high mortality rate of a terrorist.”115 No amount of troop 
concentrations or political wrangling will end terrorism in the northeast for the 
foreseeable future. The struggle to improve the security situation in the area will be a 
very protracted one fraught with occasional setbacks and numerous challenges.  
The security situation in the northeast has experienced limited improvement in the 
last three years. Since 2000, terrorism-related fatalities have either stabilized or declined 
in every state. This is due primarily on intensified counterterrorism operations and Indian 
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efforts to improve coordination between multiple security organizations. Raiding safe 
houses, arresting cadres, and interrogating leaders has helped uncover and eliminate 
important sources of financial support to the insurgents. Additionally, international 
cooperation with the governments of Nepal, Myanmar, and most significantly 
Bangladesh, has begun to bear fruit. The success of future anti-terrorism efforts will 
depend largely on these emerging ties. Political solutions to terrorism in the northeast still 
leave much to be desired. Yet as the economic and social situations improve, terrorist 
groups will begin to notice diminished popular support. Overall, India’s counterterrorism 
gains have been relatively small but the potential remains for significant future 
improvements.  
To date, Indian security concerns in the northeast are best characterized as a mix 
of military action and political negotiations with the insurgent organizations. Future 
success will depend on plugging the sources of weapons and cutting off insurgents' funds. 
Additionally, a strong legitimate economy must be engendered in the region, sustained by 
large-scale Indian and foreign investment. This will stifle the growth of the smuggling-
oriented economy, lessen popular discontent and erode the terrorist’s base of support.116 
 
H.  RELEVANCE FOR U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS 
The United States can draw many important lessons from India’s counterterrorism 
efforts in its northeast. U.S. military forces have faced terrorist threats in foreign 
countries similar to those in northeast India. Social discontent, ethnic rivalries, political 
opposition, and religious extremism are significant characteristics in Bosnia, Kosovo, and 
Sierra Leon. However, the current U.S. involvement that most closely resembles this case 
is Afghanistan. A comprehensive analysis of each country’s particular details far exceeds 
the scope of this thesis. However, enough communalities exist to effectively draw 
important parallels. U.S. counterterrorism policy makers must bear in mind four key 
lessons. 
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First, economic plans, though important, are insufficient to end a terrorist 
insurgency. Aid packages, money-for-weapons exchanges, capital infusions, and new 
infrastructure programs will never, alone, stop terrorist violence. Employment programs 
are the most likely of the economic tools to reduce or end terrorism in a region.  
Second, border security is essential. Though no border can ever be impenetrable, 
porous, loosely guarded borders invite nefarious activities. Terrorists will continue to 
exploit illegal border crossings. For the United States this has two serious implications. 
American borders and ports of entry must be continually strengthened to stop illegal 
entries. Additionally, U.S. forces overseas, in situations like America’s involvement in 
Iraq, must be capable of monitoring cross-border transit. Lax border security, as in 
India’s northeast, allows (and can even promote) terrorism and insurgency.  
Third, in an increasingly global society, effective counterterrorism can only be 
achieved with solid regional cooperation. For India, this means re-energizing Bangladesh, 
Bhutan and Myanmar on counterterrorism cooperation. The United States must recognize 
that countries neighboring areas of U.S. involvement are an integral part of the 
counterterrorism and force protection strategy.  
Fourth, security forces at all levels must have the requisite strength, coordination 
and intelligence necessary to operate as a cohesive counter-terrorist force. Domestically, 
U.S. federal and state law enforcement agencies must improve their joint operations 
capability and information handling. Externally, U.S. forces, like those in Iraq, must 
recognize that they will increasingly be called upon to function in law enforcement roles. 
This presents numerous challenges for forces trained primarily in traditional “force on 
force” military conflict. However, successful American counterterrorism efforts will 
require a greater amalgamation of U.S. military and civilian (be they American or 
foreign) law enforcement personnel. 
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IV. MILITANCY IN KASHMIR 
 
 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
Violence in Kashmir is India’s most serious internal security problem and 
illustrates the limitations of New Delhi’s counterterrorism effort.117 According to Indian 
Prime Minister Atal Vajpayee, over 16,000 civilians have been killed in Kashmir since 
terrorism took hold in the late 1980s.118 The total number of casualties, however, is 
significantly higher. According to one account, terrorism killed over 36,000 people by the 
end of 2003.119 Though Kashmir has been wracked by violence for the last two decades, 
terrorism as it is understood today, is a relatively recent phenomenon.  
The Indian government has tried various counterterrorism strategies to curtail the 
hostility and enhance regional stability. These efforts, however, have only been partially 
successful due to a variety of factors. Political vacillation, economic uncertainty, the rise 
of militant Muslim organizations, the infiltration of foreign backed insurgents, and 
widespread public distrust of the government due to perceived corruption and heavy-
handedness have all eroded the foundation of New Delhi’s efforts to bring peace to 
Kashmir.  
This chapter presents a brief overview of the history and intricacies of the 
Kashmir problem. It then presents the rise of modern Kashmiri terrorism beginning in 
1989, an overview of the major terrorists organizations involved, and Pakistan’s links to 
terrorism in Kashmir. Finally, it outlines India’s counterterrorism strategies vis-à-vis 
Kashmir from which it extracts four significant lessons applicable to U.S. 
counterterrorism efforts. First, international aid to the terrorist groups must be cut. 
Kashmiri terrorism, which began as an indigenous insurgency, became particularly 
deadly with the introduction of Pakistani-backed terrorist groups. New weapons, tactics 
and personnel changed the specter of terrorism in Kashmir, making the threat particularly 
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lethal and resistant to New Delhi’s counterterrorism efforts. Second, political efforts to 
appease terrorist organizations will never result in long-term stability or lasting peace. 
The intricate networks of terrorist organizations in Kashmir have proven exceptionally 
adept at splintering or regrouping. As the Indian government strikes deals with terrorist 
groups, others rise to prominence—often with progressively greater demands. 
Subsequent negotiations have made the government appear weak and indecisive, which is 
then exploited by the insurgent groups to undermine the public’s confidence. Third, the 
government must attack terrorist groups from within. Oppressive military might and 
“force-on-force” engagements will not end terrorism. Efforts must be made to infiltrate 
terrorist organizations or exploit captured or surrendered members to unearth the roots of 
the movement. Years of killing individual cadre members did little to weaken terrorist 
organizations in Kashmir. India’s greatest gains, however, have come by the removal of 
senior leaders directly responsible for organizing and motivating the violence. Finally, 
every action, both militarily and politically, must be focused on shifting the public’s 
support away from the terrorists and toward the government. India’s Kashmir experience 
demonstrates that counterterrorism should not be viewed as a war against terrorists but a 
battle for public support.  
 
B.  BACKGROUND—KASHMIR FROM 1947-1989 
Kashmir is located on the northern tip of the Indian subcontinent and shares 
borders with China on the East, Russia on the North, and Pakistan and Afghanistan on the 
West. Kashmir’s geography has made it a key strategic location that has been fought over 
for centuries. By the late nineteenth century, the Kashmir region was a central component 
of British efforts to defend their territory from a possible Russian invasion.120 By the 
early twentieth century, Kashmir was incorporated into Britain’s Defense of India Plan, 
which considered the region of “vital importance.”121 Presently, Kashmir’s contested 
relationship between India and Pakistan, nuclear-armed rivals, and its links to numerous 
terrorist organizations demonstrate that its strategic value remains of equal or greater 
importance today. 
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In addition to Kashmir’s strategic geography, the land is renowned for its 
abundant natural resources and vibrant bio-diversity. Surrounded by the magnificent 
Himalayan Mountains, over seventy percent of Kashmir is either mountainous or 
forested. However, the remaining thirty percent of its arable land is extraordinarily fertile. 
Abundant crops, that include rice, lettuce, cabbage, fruits, and nuts, give the state great 
agricultural potential.  
Likewise, Kashmir is as rich culturally and religiously as it is in any other way. At 
its onset, the region was predominantly Sunni Muslim. Nonetheless, large Hindu and 
Buddhist sections were present as well, with the Hindus primarily in the plains and the 
Buddhists in the more mountainous northeast. Other religious and ethnic groups in the 
region included small groups of Shia Muslims, Sikhs, and certain nomadic groups such as 
the Bakarwals and Gujjars. Sir Owen Dixon, in his report to the United Nations, 
emphasized the amalgamated quality of the region when he described Kashmir as an 
“agglomeration” that transcended geography, demographics, or economics.122 The area’s 
social and cultural diversity reflected Kashmir’s strategic location along the land routes 
between South and Central Asia.123 
Despite its varied demographics, close cultural and religious interaction in 
Kashmir ultimately resulted in the emergence of a common Kashmiri language and 
culture. The Kashmiri language helped foment the idea of a shared cultural bond that 
transcended religions or ethnicities. This unique Kashmiri identity eventually became 
known as Kashmiriyat and established to many Kashmiris that a secular, non-Islamic 
cultural identity was possible.124 
India’s partition severely impacted Kashmiri society. The India Independence Act 
of 1947 required British India’s 562 princely states to either remain with India or unite 
with Pakistan. Autonomy, preferred by some in Kashmir, was not a viable option.125 
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Popular consent was to be the criteria for choosing which country to unite with. The 
decisions were, for the most part, easily made based on the respective religious and ethnic 
concentrations of the states. 
However, the situation in Kashmir was more complex. Though a Hindu, Hari 
Singh, the reigning Maharaja, ruled a predominantly Muslim state. This was not 
necessarily uncommon or intrinsically problematic as various Indian states, such as 
Junagadh and Hyderabad, had leaders that were ethnically or religiously different from 
their population bases. However, Kashmir, being the largest of all the princely territories 
and bordering four other countries, was arguably the most significant.  
Political violence in Kashmir escalated as the partition neared. Militant political 
cadres had been stoking the coals of discontent against the Maharaja for many years. 
Prevailing opinions chaffed at his egregious taxation and his perceived insensitivity to the 
Muslim majority. Open rebellion began in 1947 when the Muslims of the Poonch region 
rose up against him, ostensibly to “liberate” their Muslim brothers. According to historian 
Alastair Lamb, however, the “Poonch Rebellion” was as much about plundering loot as it 
was about a jihad for liberation.126 Regardless of its impetus, these early Kashmiri rebels 
encountered an oppressive military response.  
The situation worsened as Muslim rebels from the neighboring Northwest 
Frontier Province (NWFP) engulfed the state and advanced on Srinagar, the state’s 
capital. In desperation, the Maharaja deserted his capital and sought Indian intervention. 
Help came, but only after he signed the accession agreement. Indian forces hastened to 
the region. Compounding the problem was the perception—at least from Pakistan’s point 
of view—that Governor-General Louis Mountbatten was becoming increasingly biased to 
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the Hindu point of view.127 Though not the beginning of Muslim-Hindu violence, the 
creation of Pakistan and the subsequent accession of Kashmir to India were major 
components of the India-Pakistan dispute over the region. 
The Kashmir problem was further complicated by a series of Indo-Pakistani 
conflicts. The two nations fought openly over Kashmir in 1947-8 and again in 1965. Both 
wars ended as stalemates. A third war in 1971, which resulted in a Pakistani defeat and its 
loss of East Pakistan, also included fighting over Kashmir. India’s military supremacy, 
especially following the 1971 war, diminished Pakistan’s hopes of taking Kashmir by 
force.128  
In addition to these stinging military setbacks, changes in Pakistani politics and 
society altered violence in Kashmir. Many of these changes began to crystallize during 
General Zia ul-Haq’s administration, which began in 1977. Two factors were most 
significant. First, Pakistan became the conduit of overt and covert international military 
aid to Afghanistan. Afghani Mujaheddin began receiving arms and funding from the 
Unites States, China and various Arab nations during its ten-year resistance to Soviet 
occupation.129 Many fighters, drawing on their experience in insurgency operations in 
Afghanistan, later moved their operations to Kashmir. Additionally, the Pakistani 
government’s experience of training and controlling insurgents in Afghanistan during the 
1980s provided ready experience for intervention in Kashmir in 1989.  
The second major change to Pakistani society was the emergence of increasingly 
radical Islamic movements. Muslim extremists in Kashmir evolved from a tradition of 
active Islamic movements, founded on the Wahabi theology of some Pakistani religious 
seminaries. These forces encouraged the “overt politicization of Islam around symbolic 
ideas of a jihad or a purified religion stripped of non-Islamic culture.”130 These ideas 
came as a direct reflex from Pakistan’s years under Ayub Khan, which were marked by 
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staunch secularism and concerted efforts to purge Islam from the political process.131 
Rising militancy in Pakistan later had concrete effects on conflict in Kashmir. These 
changes in Pakistani politics and society, and Pakistan’s involvement in Afghanistan 
were important antecedents of Kashmiri violence. However, 1989 marked the beginning 
of indigenous Kashmiri violence, sparked by internal political and social problems there.  
 
C.  MODERN KASHMIRI TERRORISM 
1. Azadi and the Kashmiri Insurgency: 1989-1993 
The explosion of violence that occurred in Kashmir in 1989 marked the beginning 
of the indigenous Kashmiri terrorist movement. The effort was focused on achieving 
Azadi, or independence for Kashmir. The sudden onset and virulent nature of the Azadi 
movement surprised both New Delhi and Islamabad.132 Considerable evidence indicates 
that Kashmiriyat, the secular ties that had previously bound the region’s members, was 
unraveling. The rise of Islamic activism, driven in part by the perceived success of the 
Iranian revolution, was spurred on by the rapid spread of Muslim schools, called 
madrassas, throughout Kashmir. Kashmiris began to turn to these madrassas to counter 
what they saw as New Delhi’s failure to provide alternatives. Coupled with rising 
unemployment and declining economic prosperity, acrid sentiments that New Delhi had 
neglected Kashmir spread quickly.133  
Much of Kashmir’s internal terrorist challenge comes as a result of political 
frustration. Popular perception during most of the 1980s and 1990s was that both the state 
and federal governments had failed in their political responsibilities. New Delhi’s 
responses did little to change this perception and, in many instances, intensified it. 
According to one study conducted by Brigadier Arjun Ray, religious fanaticism had little 
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to do with the rise of terrorism in Kashmir. Instead, economic and political frustrations 
were cited as the most prevalent factors—at least in the beginning.134 Compounding the 
political frustration was the pervasive feeling that lasting political reforms were 
untenable. This feeling of political disaffection has motivated many to pursue Azadi.135 
The Kashmiri public’s calls for political reform went largely unheeded by the Indian 
government.  
During the 1980s, the situation in Kashmir became increasingly tenuous, the 
Indian government intervened politically and militarily with increasing frequency. 
Various state administrations were dismissed, including that of Farooq Abdullah while 
others, such as Abdullah’s successor G. M. Shah, were seen as New Delhi collaborators. 
Later, during Abdullah’s re-election bid, allegations surfaced that the Indian government 
was manipulating the election, which further incited anti-Delhi sentiments. “Unable to 
express dissent in an institutional context, this new generation of Kashmiris resorted to 
violence.”136 As Kashmir’s politics and economics ground to a halt, terrorist violence 
began in earnest, with many groups emerging almost simultaneously. 
The most prominent terrorist group to emerge from the fray is the Jammu and 
Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF). The JKLF began as secular, nationalistic movement 
and has a long history of armed struggle against Indian intervention. However, the JKLF 
has moved significantly toward Islamic activism. Some of its leaders even began calling 
for the establishment of Nizam-i-Mustafa, an Islamic government based on the Quran and 
the Sunna.137 This renewed vigor has prompted JKLF members to kidnap and kill those 
representing secular or “un-Islamic” ideas like they did to the vice-chancellor of Kashmir 
University in April 1991. Recently the JKLF renounced terrorism and began to espouse 
peaceful political dialogue. It remains, however, one of the most influential forces in 
Kashmir and closely connected to other terrorist organizations. 
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Two other terrorist groups, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammad 
(JeM), have become significant forces in Kashmir.138 Jaish-e-Mohammad is a rapidly 
growing group that was founded by Maulana Masood Azhar. Prior to JeM’s founding, 
Azhar was a prominent terrorist who had been incarcerated by India for his involvement 
with other insurgent groups. However, the Indian government released Azhar as a result 
of the hijack of an Indian Airlines airplane in 1999. Azhar established the JeM shortly 
thereafter.  
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba is arguably the most violent terrorist group in Kashmir and is 
characterized by its intense religious extremism.139 LeT militants have become 
increasingly vociferous in their calls for jihad against the state and federal government, 
issuing a statement saying, “we are fighting against anti-Islamic forces…Western 
countries are anti-Islamic and America is the biggest enemy of Islam.”140 LeT then 
published a pamphlet titled “Why We are Waging Jihad” that specified its goal of 
restoring Islamic rule over all of India.141 This increasingly radical tone led Indian and 
western observers to conclude that the ideological impetus for religious extremism in 
Kashmir was indeed coming from Afghanistan and Pakistan, and “especially the 
madrassas which had trained the young students who had formed the Taliban in 
Afghanistan.”142 LeT distinguishes itself from most Kashmiri terrorist groups by its 
ability to conduct attacks in other parts of India. In 2000, LeT operatives attacked the Red 
Fort in Delhi and attempted to assassinate Bal Thackery, a hard-line Hindu politician 
based in Bombay. LeT was later implicated in the suicide attack on India’s Parliament in 
December 2001.143 
Kashmiri terrorist groups have been remarkably adept at splintering into new 
factions. Some terrorist groups in Kashmir have become so fragmented that even 
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resistance groups cannot keep them straight, much less the Indian government. For 
instance, in 1995, six foreign tourists were abducted. None of the major terrorist 
organizations took responsibility and for over two weeks Indian authorities and Kashmiri 
insurgents were equally baffled. On 17 July, a hand-written note indicated that a little-
known group called Al-Faran was responsible and demanded the release of twenty-one 
militants in Indian custody. After one hostage was killed, even the more established 
insurgent and terrorist organizations denounced Al-Faran. The All Parties Hurriyat 
(Freedom) Conference (APHC), a political consolidation that often spoke on behalf of the 
terrorist groups, declared, “Who are these people who come into existence at a time when 
we are trying to gain support for our movement day and night? [We] do not believe that 
they are in anyway committed to the Kashmiris’ struggle.”144 American hostage John 
Childs eventually escaped his captors and was rescued by a reconnaissance helicopter. 
The fate of the remaining four remains a mystery though their survival seems highly 
unlikely.145 
 
2. Foreign Influence in Kashmir: 1993-1999 
By 1993, Pakistan’s influence on the Kashmiri violence became more apparent 
and evolved into a subversive “proxy war” with India lasting throughout the 1990s. 
Pakistan’s government had returned to civilian control in December 1988 when Benazir 
Bhutto took control of the country. During her administration, the military and the ISI 
assumed greater autonomy and, according to the Pakistani newspaper Dawn, often kept 
the civilian political institution in the dark.146 Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence 
Directorate (ISI) was particularly active coordinating the flow of weapons and personnel 
into Kashmir, as it had done so adeptly in Afghanistan. The ISI’s involvement in 
Kashmir, though vehemently denied by Pakistan, has been reported by numerous sources. 
In 1992, George K. Tanham, in a study prepared for the Under Secretary of Defense, 
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reported, “Pakistanis continue to aid and abet the dissidents in Punjab and Kashmir,”147 
and the U.S. State Department’s Patterns of Global Terrorism—1993 declared, “There 
are credible reports of support by the Government of Pakistan for Kashmiri militants.”148 
By 1993, ISI involvement in various terrorist groups had reached an all-time high. 
Groups such as Al Barq and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen were the main recipients of the ISI’s 
financial and weapons aid. Significant arms transfers included: fin-stabilized rockets, 
60mm mortars, automatic grenade launchers, advanced communication gear, high-power 
sniper rifles with infrared scopes, and an assortment of explosives.149 Kashmiri police, on 
the other hand were usually armed with pistols, obsolete .303 Enfield rifles, or bold-
action 7.62mm rifles. Para-military and army forces fared better, and police units were 
eventually equipped with more modern equipment including self-loading rifles, light 
machine guns and bulletproof vests.150 However, there was a significant disparity 
between terrorist weapons and local security forces for a number of years. 
In the late 1990s, international terrorist connections with Kashmir became more 
relevant. Indications of Usama bin Ladin’s involvement in the training of Kashmiri 
terrorists became more credible during this time.151 Pakistani and Afghani terrorist groups 
such as Al Badr, Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, and Harakat ul-Mujahideen became increasingly 
prolific in Kashmir with many indications of logistical, financial, and operational support 
between terrorist forces in Kashmir and those in Pakistan and Afghanistan. These 
connections were further uncovered after the United States attacked terrorist training 
camps located in Afghanistan in August 1998. According to the U.S. State Department, 
some of those killed were identified as Kashmiri terrorists, suggesting that Kashmiri 
terrorism was more closely linked to Pakistan and Afghanistan than previously 
thought.152 
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3. New Delhi’s Response 
India’s primary response to Kashmiri terrorism during most of the 1990s was 
oppressive military force. The Indian government mobilized massive troop reserves that 
numbered roughly 300,000 security forces by 1995.153 The focus of this was to root out 
the militants while severing their support from Pakistan. One of the most successful 
tactics employed during this time was the use of captured or surrendered militants. 
Individuals were employed clandestinely to identify other key personnel, hideouts, plans, 
and weapons caches.  
New Delhi sought other conflict resolution methods as well. On the financial 
front, large investments in public services, infrastructure and social programs aimed to 
ease the economic burdens of the Kashmiris. Efforts such as job training programs 
generally failed to make noticeable changes in the social situation in the state. New Delhi 
blamed this on social instability resulting from the non-stop terrorist threats. Dissidents, 
conversely, blamed the Indian government for doing too little, too late and for generally 
ignoring the Kashmiri people and their problems. 
However, these efforts slowly brought change. By late 1996, terrorism in Kashmir 
began to decline. Annual casualties from the preceding three years hovered near 3,000. 
However, by the end of 1996, totals had fallen to 2,372.154 Though these gains were 
modest, they bolstered public support and police morale.  
One of the most significant counterterrorism tactics to emerge during these years 
was the concerted use of former militants. Though Indian efforts to “reform” terrorists 
and integrate them into mainstream society proved largely unsuccessful, New Delhi 
began a concerted effort to utilize those that voluntarily changed side. The case of 
Muhammad Yousef Parray typifies this effort. Parray, known popularly as “Kuka,” 
reportedly turned to militancy to avenge the death of his nephew, Manzoor Ahmed, who 
belonged to the terrorist group Ikwan-ul-Muslimeen. Kuka Parray later switched sides 
forming his own counter-insurgency group. Targeting primarily Jamat-i-Islami and Hizb-
ul-Mujahideen, Parray emerged as a “Robin Hood” figure in Kashmir and turned his 
skyrocketing popularity into political victory in 1996 when he was elected to the Kashmir 
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local assembly. Parray worked closely with Indian security forces and was highly 
successful at encouraging other militants to renounce terrorism. Upon seeing the dramatic 
potential of this counterterrorism tactic, New Delhi began focusing on other ex-terrorists 
such as Javed Shah, Setha Guggar, and Sareer Khan.155  
In a bid to capitalize on the situation, New Delhi attempted to re-energize the 
political process by holding state elections that September. Surprisingly, the voter turnout 
was fifty-three percent. The National Conference (NC), led by Farooq Abdullah, won 
decidedly.156  
Following the 1996 elections, a pervasive optimism suggested that real progress 
was being made in Kashmir. There were little doubts that Kashmir’s reconstruction 
would be difficult. However, having a newly elected local leader gave many Kashmiris 
hope and allowed other local politicians back into the political realm. The NC promised 
major democratic reforms, a swift end to the terrorist violence, and economic re-
vitalization. Additionally, Abdullah energized local residents with promises that he would 
secure greater autonomy from New Delhi, rehabilitate the terrorists, punish those guilty 
of human rights violations, and eventually enable the Kashmiri Police to assume 
responsibility from the Indian army. Political and economic reforms became the central 
issues in the state’s counterterrorism efforts.  
Farooq Abdullah’s performance in Kashmir left all parties unsatisfied. His 
government failed to fulfill most of its promises. Kashmiris began to chaff from his 
extended time away from the state and for failing to pursue those guilty of human rights 
violations. Terrorism resurged, prompting New Delhi to suspend both troop withdrawal 
and power transfer to the state. Widespread Kashmiri disillusionment in both the local 
and federal governments resulted. 
The proxy war in Kashmir changed significantly in 1999. Pakistani Prime 
Minister Nawaz Sharif and Indian Prime Minister Atal Vajpayee established a number of 
confidence-building measures meant to lower tensions over Kashmir. Indications 
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suggested that a groundbreaking agreement—to include major concessions by both 
sides—was being readied, which if implemented would have possibly led to the 
establishment of the Line of Control (LOC) as an international border.157 However, major 
military developments in the Kargil region scuttled those initiatives. 
 
4. The Kargil War and Its Impact on Kashmiri Terrorism 
In the summer of 1999, Pakistan’s Army Chief of Staff, General Pervez 
Musharraf, deployed regular army units and insurgent fighters into the Kargil region of 
Kashmir. Directly challenging Sharif, Musharraf’s actions negated the progress made in 
the preceding months. Pakistani forces of its Northern Light Infantry (NLI), reinforced by 
members of both Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, surreptitiously prepared 
and occupied defensive positions in the Kargil area of Kashmir on the Indian side of the 
LOC. India, surprised by the large scale of the Pakistani infiltration, responded with a 
massive troop mobilization. 
Fighting in Kargil escalated quickly. Initially the conflict consisted predominantly 
of skirmishes between smaller units. However, after three weeks the Indian Air Force 
(IAF) was tasked to assist the ground forces that had largely failed to make progress 
against well-defended positions occupied by Pakistani forces. The following month 
brought more escalations as the Indian Navy was deployed as a “show of force” factor off 
Pakistan’s coast—moves that caused substantial concern in Islamabad.158 By July, India 
had deployed over three divisions to the area and it seemed as if a full-scale war was 
imminent. International condemnation of Pakistan’s actions was swift and the country 
was increasingly isolated from positive international attention. Urgent mediation by U.S. 
President Bill Clinton and General Anthony Zinni helped end the conflict by pressuring 
Pakistan to accept an unconditional troop withdraw. 
The Kargil War had direct implications for terrorism in Kashmir. It illustrated the 
strong military-insurgent nexus existing in the Pakistan side of Kashmir and 
demonstrated the military’s influence over Pakistan. Musharraf, after withdrawing his 
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troops from Kashmir, turned toward Islamabad leading a rebellion that removed Sharif 
from power. The Kargil War and Musharraf’s coup suggested to many in India that a 
negotiated settlement over Kashmir was unlikely, if not impossible. 
Following the Kargil war, Kashmir saw a dramatic rise in the number of terror 
attacks. Specifically, suicide bombings became particularly prevalent. According to a 
former Indian intelligence expert, B. Raman, terrorist organizations in Kashmir made a 
concerted effort to import Usama bin-Laden’s brand of suicide terrorism, which had been 
largely unknown prior to 1999.159 Security forces were the most common targets as 
military and police infrastructures suffered a withering barrage of attacks. 
 
5. Kashmiri Terrorism Post 11 September 2001 
The attacks of 11 September 2001 dramatically changed the environment for 
terrorism in Kashmir. The combination of international condemnation and U.S. counter-
terrorism operations forced India and Pakistan to reevaluate their operational and 
strategic situations vis-à-vis Kashmir. For Pakistan, the developments were both positive 
and negative. Pakistan’s new relevance in America’s global war on terrorism helped 
bolstered Musharraf’s legitimacy and resulted in large political and economic 
concessions from Washington. New Delhi viewed this as a major step backward, 
especially in light of the concerted efforts to isolate the Musharraf regime following 
Kargil.  
Another major event impacting Kashmiri terrorism was the 2002 crisis. India 
mobilized massive troop concentrations along the LOC in response to the suicide attack 
on the Indian Parliament on 13 December 2001. Pakistani forces followed suit and were 
rushed into combat readiness positions. Throughout the spring of 2002 it appeared that 
war was probable. On 5 June 2002 the U.S. State Department warned the 60,000 
Americans by declaring, “Tensions have risen to serious levels and the risk of intensified 
military hostilities between India and Pakistan cannot be ruled out.” The statement then 
stated, “American citizens in India are strongly urged to depart the country.”160 New 
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Delhi was adamant that Pakistan end infiltrations into Kashmir. Senior U.S. officials, 
including Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage and Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld both visited the region in an attempt to help defuse the situation. Despite 
Musharraf’s refusal to unilaterally demobilize Pakistani troops from the LOC, by August 
2002 Indian officials indicated that infiltrations, though still continuing, had declined 
noticeably. 
The 2002 crisis was a crucial turning point for Pakistani-based terrorists. First, it 
demonstrated India’s willingness to adopt an offensive military posture against Pakistan 
when challenged by Pakistani-backed terrorism. Second, the Parliament attack and the 
resulting military deployments prompted intense international pressure on Musharraf that 
may have driven him to denounce terrorist tactics in January 2002. Pakistan’s ISI, which 
lost training camps in Afghanistan after 11 September 2001, was then ordered by 
Musharraf to close its Kashmir offices.161 Musharraf commenced a crackdown on 
terrorists and directed a wave of highly publicized arrests. Many militant organizations, 
including LeT and JeM, were outlawed.162 However, many in India doubted his sincerity 
since most of the arrested terrorists were pardoned and released shortly thereafter and the 
banned organizations quickly reorganized under different names.163 Additionally, cross-
border infiltrations, which declined during the months of February-April 2002, rose 
precipitously by mid-April and have continued largely unabated.164 This development 
highlights that the military-terrorist relationship in the Pakistan-Kashmir region remains 
intact.  
 
D.  CURRENT INDIAN STRATEGY 
The Indian government has tried numerous methods to end terrorist violence in 
Kashmir. The strategy most favored by hard-line BJP members in Delhi has been 
aggressive military operations. New Delhi has attempted to “stamp out” terrorism by 
force for nearly fifteen years. When Kashmiri separatists began their armed struggle in 
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1989, New Delhi deployed the Indian army and central security forces such as the Central 
Reserve Police Force (CRPF), the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBF), and the Border 
Security Force (BSF).165 These organizations were given two main goals: the "direct 
liquidation of the insurgents and their support base within Kashmir and the elimination of 
support of all kinds, especially of the influx of armed insurgents, from sources outside the 
state."166 Three tactics were used to accomplish these goals. First, “secure zones” were 
created and heavily patrolled. This essentially denied terrorists certain areas of 
operations. Second, security forces began systematically cordoning villages to conduct 
extensive searches. Finally, according to Robert Wirsing, New Delhi authorized the use 
of both “judicial and extrajudicial punishment” as a way to curb the violence.167 This 
tactic prompted some international organizations to harshly criticize India on the basis of 
human rights violations. 
The issue of human rights bears heavily on India’s counterterrorism strategy in 
Kashmir. Much of the 1990s was marked by draconian reprisals to terrorist attacks that, 
according to many outside observers, were repressive and extreme. Lists of alleged 
heavy-handedness are long and graphic. International organizations such as Amnesty 
International and Asia Watch have stated that India has systematically violated 
international human rights law.”168 A 1996 report by Human Rights Watch concluded 
that both India and Pakistan were responsible for atrocities in Kashmir and that Indian 
security forces were prone to abusive tactics including summary executions, 
disappearances, torture and rape.169 New Delhi has vehemently denied human rights 
violations by its forces. However, Indian legislation has undermined public confidence in 
New Delhi’s ability to remain neutral. For example, the Armed Forces (Jammu and 
Kashmir) Special Ordinance provides prosecutorial immunity for security forces engaged 
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in, “anything done or purported to be done in exercise of power conferred by this Act.”170 
True or not, popular perceptions, both in Kashmir and internationally, hold that Indian 
security forces have taken excessive liberties with their powers. Where true, human rights 
violations represent unnecessary suffering for the Kashmiri people and debilitate New 
Delhi’s efforts to engender public support.  
Politically, India has waged a concerted effort to link Kashmiri violence with 
America’s global war on terrorism. This provides greater justification for a hard-line 
approach preferred by some in the BJP-led coalition government. Additionally, India 
seems determined to avoid international mediation in Kashmir—a position it has held for 
most of its existence. This is primarily due to two reasons. First, some would consider an 
internationally mediated solution a waste of India’s unquestioned military advantage, 
especially in light of the 1971 war. Second, Pakistan’s historical closeness to the United 
States casts doubt, from New Delhi’s point of view, that an international solution would 
go well for India. By marginalizing Pakistan and linking Kashmiri terrorism to U.S. 
counterterrorism efforts, India hopes to maintain its military and political leverage over 
Pakistan while denying Islamabad help from abroad. 
There are indications, however, that India’s longstanding aversion to international 
involvement may be waning. India welcomed U.S. intervention during the Kargil conflict 
and again in 2002 following the terrorist attacks on Delhi’s Parliament building. 
Additionally, New Delhi has made increasing calls for international pressure on Pakistan 
to end cross-border infiltrations—a call that resonates more clearly on the international 
forum following the global denunciation of terrorism in the last few years. As more 
countries recognize the international nature of terrorist threats, Delhi likely recognizes an 
emerging opportunity to gather international support for its position without risking 
major political losses in Kashmir.  
 
1. Violence Trends 
Violence in Kashmir has fallen slightly since the high water mark set in 2001 but 
remains relatively high. Though fewer attacks are being conducted, they are generally 
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larger and more lethal than in years past. These attacks are generally better planned, more 
carefully executed, and employ more advanced weaponry. The attacks on the State 
Legislative Assembly in October 2001 and the attack on the Indian Parliament in 
December 2001 are two excellent examples.171  
 
2. Major Indian Missteps in Kashmir 
New Delhi has committed a variety of major missteps in implementing its 
counterterrorism strategy in Kashmir. Kashmiri discontent is due as much to India’s 
counterterrorism shortcoming as it is to Pakistan’s political and military intrusions. These 
events often unraveled the delicate threads of progress, prolonging the conflict and the 
suffering. Popular support for the government (be it in Srinagar or New Delhi) fell 
precipitously after these political and military wrong turns.  
One of India’s most damaging mistakes has been the dismissal of various state 
and local governments. This has usually resulted from periods of New Delhi’s waning 
confidence in the state government’s competence, loyalty and effectiveness. The 1984 
dismissal of the Farooq Abdullah administration is a telling example. Abdullah had been 
popularly elected in 1977 with a great deal of public support. Kashmiris jokingly refer to 
Abdullah’s election as “the only fair election in Kashmir.”172 Following his removal, 
there was a tremendous groundswell of popular discontent that, according to scholars 
such as Ved Marwah, led directly to the establishment of terrorist networks a short time 
later. As New Delhi summarily dismissed various state governors and assemblies, and as 
each new state administration purged key personnel from its posts, public confidence 
tumbled. This practice has done tremendous damage to the government’s credibility and 
effectiveness.173 
Another of New Delhi’s least effective strategies was negotiating with the various 
terrorist groups. At various times both New Delhi and the Kashmiri state governments 
have attempted to strike deals with the terrorists. These attempts have typically come 
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after periods of aggressive military and police counterterrorism efforts. Often 
negotiations have centered on cease-fire agreements or hostage-for-prisoner exchanges. 
Rarely have negotiations enhanced security in anyway though they have often served to 
discredit the government, legitimatize insurgent organizations, and embolden terrorist 
attacks.174 
 
3. Peace Initiatives 
In addition to aggressive military efforts, New Delhi has attempted peace 
initiatives to broker security in Kashmir. These initiatives have largely failed to reduce 
terrorism and increase public safety. The events of 2001, perhaps the most violent year in 
Kashmir’s history, are indicative of this fact. On 27 November 2000, New Delhi 
announced a one-month ceasefire as a “good faith” gesture. However, none of the 
significant terrorist organizations agreed to the effort, which subsequently became a 
month-long cessation of counterterrorist operations, with terrorist attacks going 
unchecked. The Indian government renewed the cease-fire for three consecutive months 
until 23 May 2001. Though total fatalities during this period fell when compared to the 
previous six-month period, this was primarily due to a significant decline in the number 
of terrorists killed. Terrorist attacks and civilian casualties, on the other hand, increased 
notably during the ceasefire.175 Current rapprochement efforts are structured heavily on 
ceasefire deals. However, some of the most significant Kashmiri ethnic groups, such as 
Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, have declared that ceasefire agreements will not stop their struggle 
for Kashmiri independence. Saleem Hashmi, spokesman for Hizb-ul, said, “The ceasefire 
is between the two armies and is limited to the Line of Control. Our fight against the 
Indian forces will continue in Kashmir. [A] ceasefire is not the solution. The problem 
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does not resolve until the Kashmir issue gets resolved.”176 This shows the weakness of 
counterterrorism strategies that focus primarily on brokered deals or ceasefire agreements 
with terrorist organizations. 
As reports indicate, most Kashmiris are tired of the violence. Simultaneously 
denouncing Pakistan’s proxy war, Islamabad’s territorial ambitions, and the long-
standing conflict with Indian forces, Kashmiri citizens seem increasingly ready for 
peaceful negotiations. Kashmiri’s are becoming less tolerant of the militant Muslim 
groups, both indigenous and foreign, that used to draw support from the communities.177 
There are indications that the situation can improve. In February 2004 Indian and 
Pakistani diplomats met in Islamabad to discuss various peace proposals—all of which 
include Kashmir. This is significant because for terrorism to end in Kashmir, Pakistan 
must be involved. Indian officials likely feel that now is an opportune time to deal with 
Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf, thanks in part to the great pressure being place 
upon him regarding terrorism in his country.  
Three factors are converging on Musharraf simultaneously. First, the United 
States is pressuring Pakistan to end support to militancy in Kashmir as part of the global 
war on terror. Pakistan has responded by prosecuting the killers of journalist Daniel 
Pearl, fortifying the border with Afghanistan, and arresting various terrorist leaders. 
These actions have been denounced by some Pakistanis as traitorous and by some Indians 
as hollow. However, this suggests, in principle if not in practice, Islamabad’s improving 
disposition vis-à-vis reducing terrorism. Second, Pakistan faces the daunting task of 
repairing its international reputation following its nuclear technology scandal in which 
the country’s leading nuclear weapons expert admitted to illegally selling nuclear 
technology to Libya and Iran.178 Third, insurgents within Pakistan have tried to 
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assassinate President Musharraf twice in the last six months. This demonstrates that 
Musharraf’s hold on society may be more tenuous than previously imagined. 
New Delhi has likely determined that the conditions for reduced Pakistani support 
to Kashmiri terrorism have never been better. India maintains its openness to a political 
solution with Pakistan but consistently demands that Pakistan’s support of terrorism must 
end before constructive talks can begin. In an interview with CNN, India’s Ambassador 
to the United States, Lalit Mansingh, declared, “You can’t have dialogue and terrorism at 
the same time. We are saying that if you want to shake hands with us, put the gun 
away.”179 As local support for terrorist groups diminishes, New Delhi will find its 
counterterrorism efforts significantly more successful. 
 
E.  RELEVANCE FOR U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS 
The United States can apply four important lessons from India’s counterterrorism 
efforts in Kashmir. These points are relevant to both America’s domestic 
counterterrorism strategy and its overseas prosecution of the war on terror. First, 
international aid to the terrorist groups—ideological, material, financial, logistical etc.— 
must be severed. Isolation robs terrorist groups of the means and motivations to continue 
the struggle. Border security is a major component of this task. The movement of 
personnel, money, and weapons into regions of U.S. activity, such as Afghanistan, must 
be curtailed. 
Additionally, financial resources that help sustain the terror campaign need to be 
identified and removed. Throughout most of South Asia and the Middle East, financial 
transactions often occur through unofficial channels such as the hawala network, making 
detection more difficult.180 Islamic seminaries in Iraq and Afghanistan are active 
                                                                                                                                                 
Pakistani President Musharraf quickly pardoned him—an action criticized by many world leaders. See 
“Profile: Abdul Qadeer Khan” BBC, 20 February 2004; http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_ 
asia/3343621.stml; accessed 18 March 2004.  
179 Cable News Network (CNN), “Interview with Lalit Mansingh.” (5 January 2002). www.indianembassy. 
org/amb/cnn_jan_ 05_02.html; accessed 20 December 2003. 
180 The “hawala” system operates through an intricate network of moneylenders. Known as “hawaladars,” 
these individuals transfer money without using standard physical or electronic banking methods. Receiving 
cash in one country, a hawaladar contacts an associate at the recipient’s location and directs the cash 
distribution. This often occurs using paper notes or letters after a nominal fee has been deducted. Some 
estimates hold that the hawala network handles between U.S. $2-$5 billion annually in Afghanistan and 
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participants in this system, which facilitates illicit money transfers from international 
sources. Both India and Pakistan have taken dramatic steps to curtail hawala money 
transfers, which, according to Interpol, consist of over $680 billion a year in India 
alone—nearly forty percent of India’s gross domestic product.181 In the United States, 
however, hawala remittances are only illegal in some U.S. jurisdictions with enforcement 
encumbered by a host of cultural, legal and economic complications.  Investigators are 
often unaware of the significance of hawala transfers while U.S. laws stop short of 
summarily outlawing the practice. America’s efforts to stop terrorist funding initiatives, 
such as the establishment of the Foreign Terrorist Asset Tracking Center, should focus 
heavily on these parallel banking and money transfer systems while crafting solutions to 
the various hurdles currently hampering progress. 
Second, policies of appeasement toward terrorist organizations will never yield 
long-term security and peace. Government agencies should not grant concession or 
capitulations to terrorist groups as this breeds further violence and progressively greater 
demands. Likewise, the government should internationalize its counterterrorism effort in 
much the same way the terrorists organizations seek to do. India’s reluctance to turn to 
international assistance casts doubts in the public’s mind about New Delhi’s sincerity in 
resolving the Kashmir issue. Greater gains were made, both internationally and in 
Kashmir, when the Indian government showed its willingness to turn to international 
mediation to resolve the Kargil war and the 2002 crisis. Likewise, U.S. counterterrorism 
efforts must resolutely avoid political appeasement while encouraging the international 
community to increase its counterterrorism cooperation. This is particularly relevant vis-
à-vis Pakistan, where the United States should redouble its pressure on the military-run 
government. Washington should require General Musharraf make lasting improvements 
to Pakistan’s security situation instead of hollow, publicity-oriented “victories.” These 
changes may not soon take place since there are powerful domestic forces in Pakistan’s 
religious and political camps with vested interests in continued violence. Musharraf may 
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not have the popular support requisite to survive such an effort, literally or politically. 
However, if substantive improvements occur in Pakistan, anti-U.S. terrorism in 
Afghanistan and anti-Indian terrorism in Kashmir will decline dramatically. 
Third, terrorist groups can only be broken from within. Years of troop 
deployments, forceful crackdowns and military engagements have failed to stop terrorism 
in Kashmir. Though there must be a military component to counterterrorism operations, 
terrorist groups will only cease with the elimination of their leadership. India’s greatest 
gains in Kashmir have come as a result of using “insiders” to identify key personnel, 
discover attack plans, locate weapons caches, and identify clandestine terror cells. This 
has removed many prominent terrorists such as Ghazi Baba, the operations commander 
for Jaish-e-Muhammad, who was killed on 23 September 2002.  
Finally, every action, both militarily and politically, must be focused on shifting 
the public’s support away from the terrorists and toward the government. Government 
forces must reassess their perspective on counterterrorism and approach it not as a war 
against the terrorists, but as a battle to win popular support. Government efforts to win 
the public’s confidence will increasingly erode the terrorist groups’ popular support, 
forcing them to either abandon violence or escalate their attacks, thus risking further 
alienation from the citizenry. Once the public feels that it is in its own best interest to 
support the government, the terrorists loose. After that breakwater point, additional 
terrorist attacks further distance the perpetrators from the public, especially if common 
citizens are injured or killed. Each government action must be measured against the 
litmus test of popular perception. 
Government forces will never enjoy the public’s support unless it operates openly 
and transparently. This characteristic is important for many reasons. First, it enables the 
public to influence the government’s operations. Second, it forces elected officials to deal 
more honestly with society. Perceptions of political corruption, human rights violations 
or judicial inconsistencies undermine the public’s support and encourage dissent. The 
development of free and fair democratic institutions is critical in this regard. 
Democracies have characteristics that make them particularly suited to 
counterterrorism. Governments that foster political activism and encourage systemic 
change provide their citizens with peaceful alternatives to insurgency. This lowers social 
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tensions and reduces the likelihood of anti-government or inter-ethnic attacks. Also, 
political systems that earn and maintain the public’s confidence are much more likely to 
overcome a terrorist challenge. This creates a cycle of political and social change in 
which dissidents move away from violent revolution and look to new, more constructive 
methods of effecting social change. Arthur Schlesinger characterized this as a shift from 
“public purpose” to “private interest.”182 In societies where the public’s confidence in the 
government (not the particular individuals in charge per se but the governmental system 
as a whole), terrorist attacks are more likely to provoke an anti-terrorist “backlash.”183  
Terrorism can be defeated. Well-conceived and well-executed political strategies, 
buttressed by effective—but not excessive—military force, can bring about the necessary 
social and political changes that will rob terrorists of their methods, means, and 
motivations to attack. Kashmir demonstrates that vacillating political strategies and 
heavy-handed military might weaken the government’s status and emboldens that of the 
terrorists. U.S. political and military leaders must account for these considerations in 
implementing U.S. counterterrorism strategies around the world. 
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A.  SUMMARY 
1. Future Prospects 
Terrorism is America’s greatest security threat. Terrorist attacks may strike 
domestic targets or U.S. military personnel overseas. The United States’ ability to prevent 
terrorism is a key component to its future economic and social strength, making its 
counterterrorism efforts as significant to strategic security in the twenty-first century as 
its nuclear arsenal was during the Cold War. America’s future counterterrorism prospects 
are marked by two key considerations. 
First, most indications suggest that terrorism is a growing threat. Terrorists may 
see successful attacks as “proof” that violence is a viable means of political or social 
influence. Following the 11 March 2004 terrorist attacks on Madrid’s commuter trains, 
Spanish voters ousted long-time U.S. supporter José Maria Anzar, electing José Zapatero 
in his stead. Zapatero, highly critical of Spain’s close ties to the United States, has 
indicated his intention to remove Spanish troops from Iraq and establish closer relations 
with France and Germany. The move is praised by many European leaders but according 
to some analysts, marks a significant moral victory for terrorist forces in which, “al-
Qaeda appears to have succeeded in changing the government of one European country 
through terror.”184 
Additionally, as global societies continue to interact, terrorist organizations will 
become increasingly well connected, expanding their influence and ability to link with 
other like-minded states, groups or individuals. The tools of terrorism, such as explosives, 
guns, money, logistics, clandestine communications—and the knowledge needed to 
employ these tools—are readily available. Most ominously, the specter of chemical, 
biological, or radiological attacks hangs heavily over the world. These factors, taken 
together, suggest that terrorism in the future is a virtual certainty and will likely involve 
increasingly lethal tactics, tools, and procedures.  
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Second, U.S. military deployments around the world incite anti-Americanism in 
certain regions and motivate further attacks. U.S. troop deployments to Saudi Arabia, for 
example, were an early motivating factor for al-Qaeda.185 Additionally, as U.S. forces 
deploy to an increasing number of less-familiar locations—such as Uzbekistan, the 
southern Philippines, Eritrea, Cote d’Ivoire, and most recently Haiti—terrorists are 
presented with more venues from which to launch their strikes. Finally, U.S. combat 
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have spurred a small, violent minority in those areas 
to resist stability-building measures at every turn. Global deployments and military 
operations are vital components to America’s overall security position and should 
continue when required. Their influence, however, on terrorist motivations and 
operations must be considered. 
For this reason, U.S. counterterrorism policy makers should examine terrorism in 
other countries such as India. Key similarities between India and the United States make 
parallels between the two countries particularly useful. Both countries have working 
democracies based on fundamental civil liberties. Freedom of speech, religion, and the 
press are integral to their respective political organizations and are widely embraced by 
both societies. Additionally, both nations consist of diverse demographics with numerous 
sub-national groups. Ethnic minorities, marked by different languages, cultures and 
religious beliefs, are common in both societies. America faces further challenges in its 
dealings with different cultural, religious, and ethnic groups as it continues its efforts in 
Iraq and Afghanistan. These locations suffer acute under-development, economic 
hardships, and pervasive misconceptions about Western ideologies, culture, and motives. 
Fissures between government forces and sub-national minorities have created groups bent 
on increased rights, autonomy or secession. There are important differences between the 
two cases. For instance, the United States does not face the same internal, anti-national 
terrorism that is common in some parts of India. Further, India’s external terrorist threat 
comes primarily from across its border with Pakistan, while the United States encounters 
international terrorism from many sources and in many locations.  However, taken 
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together, the challenges facing U.S. counterterrorism officials are strikingly similar to 
those the Indian government has dealt with previously.  
 
B.  FINDINGS 
1. India’s Most Successful Counterterrorism Lessons 
India’s experience provides U.S. counterterrorism policy makers many important 
lessons. New Delhi has faced terrorist and sectarian violence in three primary locations: 
Punjab, the northeast states, and Kashmir. Terrorism in these locations springs from 
ethnic, political, and religious motivations. Accordingly, India’s responses have varied, 
ranging from capitulation to overbearing military force. In some instances, New Delhi’s 
counterterrorism strategies have yielded resounding successes. Though terrorism has not 
been completely eradicated from India, India’s policies have, at times, had a dramatic 
positive influence in curbing violence and promoting stability. India’s counterterrorism 
strategy is marked by two “best practices” that highlight its most successful 
achievements. 
First, India has, over time, developed military strategies that have paid rewarding 
dividends. This was most evident in the Punjab case and yielded dramatic improvements 
to New Delhi’s overall counterterrorism capability there. Coordination between local, 
state, and federal agencies has been the most significant improvement to India’s 
counterterrorism effort over the last twenty years. Creating joint headquarters, integrated 
communication systems, and common operating procedures has helped avoid some of the 
inherent difficulties of multi-agency operations—difficulties that have, in the past, 
plagued New Delhi’s counterterrorism operations. The United States can make dramatic 
improvements in this regard. Domestically, information sharing between local and state 
police, border and immigration officials, national services such as the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI), and the military remains beleaguered notwithstanding the post-11 
September security initiatives.186 Likewise, U.S. military forces abroad must improve 
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information sharing and joint security operations with host-nation security forces.187 In 
overseas situations like Afghanistan and Iraq, U.S. troops, despite Herculean efforts, will 
never eradicate terrorism without substantial assistance from local security agencies.  
This in no means suggests that military force has no role. As terrorism expert Paul 
Wilkinson notes, even those who advocate the exclusive use of civil police concede that 
regular military force is a legitimate option in counterterrorism operations.188 As 
discussed in chapter II, India’s counterterrorism efforts in Punjab yielded lasting progress 
when regular military forces and local security agencies coordinate their efforts. 
Additionally, as the Kashmir case illustrates, using former terrorist leaders can be highly 
effective at rooting out organizations and “winning over” insurgents. However, unless an 
effective and trustworthy police or paramilitary force is established, major improvements 
to the security situation will remain untenable. Improving local security forces and 
augmenting them at times with U.S. military force, will make terrorist attacks 
simultaneously harder to conduct and less effective in their results.  
Second, New Delhi has made significant advances in its efforts to preserve and 
promote democratic institutions and processes. Nearly all of India’s early attempts to 
supplant elections, remove elected officials and disband political parties resulted in 
increased public discontent and violence. India has, since the mid-1990s, done much to 
avoid these mistakes by encouraging political parties and respecting state elections—even 
when these do not necessarily coincide with the central government. New Delhi’s efforts 
to develop viable political institutions, as discussed in chapter III, illustrate the critical 
nature of free and open politics. The United States must advance democratic institutions 
in Iraq and Afghanistan yet be prepared for outcomes that may, at times, contradict 
Washington’s goals and aspirations.  
Currently the debate in Baghdad over the structure and scope of direct elections is 
a telling example. The United States has done well thus far in respecting the ideas of 
important public figures such as Ayatollah al-Sistani, who wields remarkable sway over 
the country’s Shi’a majority. Terrorism will wane as people acquire confidence in a free 
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and representative political system. This argument contradicts that of Jack Snyder, who 
suggests that the process of developing a democracy may actually engender conflict.189 
However, by establishing, respecting, and promoting non-violent political institutions, 
citizens begin to take ownership of social problems and their respective solutions. This 
must be viewed as a long-term process. Often referred to as the “consolidation phase” of 
democratization, the institutionalization of democracy is a perpetual struggle that requires 
tireless effort.190  
 
2. India’s Most Significant Counterterrorism Shortfalls 
New Delhi has also committed a series of grave missteps that have hampered its 
ability to counter terrorism and perpetuated the root causes of the violence. Its experience 
teaches three key lessons. 
First, governments must not attempt to placate terrorist organizations for short-
term gains. India has tried, at various times, to grant wide political concessions to 
terrorists in all three of its most affected regions. Nearly every case resulted in a net loss 
for the government. Efforts to bargain hostage releases in Kashmir, for example, 
routinely resulted in the terrorist organizations gaining popular support, legitimacy, and 
political influence. Schemes such as prisoner releases, weapons buy-back programs, and 
“re-education” plans—at one time used extensively in India’s northeast—have been 
remarkable failures despite New Delhi’s claims to the contrary. Washington should 
forego these futile methods outright. In their stead should be a detailed system to address 
social grievances before they are adopted by a violent organization. If the United States 
can resolve these issues early, many terrorist groups will be left with no raison d’etre—
devoid of a cause to champion and with little or no public support. 
Second, the Indian government has suffered tremendous setbacks in its 
counterterrorism efforts due to a general lack of policy coherence. In Punjab, the 
northeast, and Kashmir, New Delhi’s policies have vacillated widely, sending mixed 
signals to the public and the terrorists. India’s on-again off-again approach to military and 
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political solutions typifies what Vijendra Singh has labeled New Delhi’s “exasperated, 
often clueless, style of governance.”191 Terrorists in these areas have quickly capitalized 
on these inconsistencies, suing for peace and international intervention when it suits their 
needs and resorting to violence when it meets their goals. America, in conjunction with 
foreign governments and administration such as the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC), must 
develop consistent and coherent counterterrorism strategies that encourage non-violence 
and punish terrorist attacks. Specifically, efforts to pursue terrorists must not cease 
despite political agreements or accords. Government efforts must resist the impetus to 
extend special considerations to unique ethnic groups or geographic regions. “Special 
autonomy” plans and unique ethnic privileges may provide short-term gains to political 
leaders, but usually prompt an unending series of further demands. As the former UN 
secretary-general, Boutros Boutros Ghali, warned, “If every ethnic, religious or linguistic 
group claimed statehood, there would be no limit to fragmentation,” adding that the 
answer is “to maintain the integrity of each while finding a balanced design for all.”192 
Third, ill-equipped security and intelligence forces have consistently hampered 
India’s counterterrorism efforts. Despite greater inter-agency cooperation, most of the 
local police and border security forces suffer from materiel deficiencies and personnel 
shortages. India’s case, particularly with regards to Kashmir and the northeast, 
demonstrates that border security is central to curbing terrorism. Terrorist training and 
logistic camps in Bangladesh, and cross-border infiltrations in Kashmir are two glaring 
examples of this problem. Though the United States does not have to contend with 
exactly the same border problems, pervasive drug and immigrant smuggling across the 
U.S.-Mexican border certainly suggests that terrorist organizations could exploit that 
situation as has been done in India. The situation in Iraq is much the same. U.S. military 
forces in Iraq announced in early March 2004 a major “tactical shift” to re-double border 
security after the attacks during the Shi’a holy festival of Ashura.193 Robust border 
security is one of the most essential means to limit terrorist’s freedom of movement and 
enhance regional security.  
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Further, security forces must be well trained to handle the unique tactical 
considerations of counterterrorist operations. These efforts are often conducted in urban 
environments that require specialized planning and practice to conduct effectively. 
Counterterrorist operations may also employ unique equipment and non-standard tactics. 
Finally, forces at all levels must be as unrelenting in their defense of human rights as they 
are in their prosecution of the terrorists. Close and transparent monitoring will help 
ensure that future counterterrorism efforts do not inadvertently alienate local populations 
and fuel further discontent. Speaking in Imphal, Paul Wilkinson explained that 
counterterrorism efforts must be highly professional as, “Democracies cannot afford any 
dilution of the rule of law.”194 
 
3. Conclusion 
For nearly fifty years, South Asia, and India in particular, were of only marginal 
importance to U.S. policy makers. The 11 September attacks and the U.S. military 
response, however, made the region paramount for American counterterrorism planners. 
The presence of Taliban remnants, al-Qaeda operatives, fervent anti-American and anti-
national terrorism, pervasive violence in Kashmir, and the potential for nuclear conflict 
between India and Pakistan make the region exceedingly important for U.S. 
counterterrorism policy.195 
India is an excellent case study of counterterrorism operations. It has dealt for 
many years with terrorists, insurgencies, separatist movements, religious fanaticism and 
political firebrands who dispense violence to further their respective causes. In much the 
same way as the al-Qaeda attacks on New York and Washington, terrorism has struck 
deep into the national psyche of Indians. The toll of terrorism has been horrendous in 
India—topping 56,000 deaths in the last twenty years.196 
The United States has many vested interests in Indian counterterrorism and 
security. Economically, India is a major trade partner with America, with trade nearing 
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$18 billion in 2002.197 Additionally, during the Bush administration there has been a 
significant push to engage India with military-to-military and law enforcement 
exchanges. For instance, U.S. Air Force intelligence personnel visited the Air 
Headquarters, Directorate of Intelligence for the first-ever Intelligence Cooperative 
Exchange (ICE) visit in September 2002.198 In an attempt to foster cooperation and joint 
counterterrorism training, U.S. and Indian Special Forces participated in Exercise 
BALANCE IROQUOIS 2003. For three weeks the units trained at the Counter 
Insurgency Jungle Warfare School (CIJWS) in Mizoram, practicing advanced counter-
insurgency actions such as deep infiltrations, hostage rescue and counterinsurgency 
marksmanship. Future joint training exercises are already planned—the next to be hosted 
by the United States on the island of Guam.199 As counterterrorism in South Asia 
becomes increasingly pertinent to U.S. security, these joint training opportunities provide 
tactical, operational and strategic lessons for American counterterrorism professionals. 
U.S. domestic and international counterterrorism efforts will benefit greatly from 
India’s case study. There is no perfect response to terrorism, nor an insurmountable 
defense. Key steps, however, can be taken to mitigate risks and consequences. Improving 
border security, enhancing U.S. military cooperation with domestic and international law 
enforcement agencies, improving intelligence gathering capabilities, strengthening multi-
national counterterrorism cooperation, shunning futile counterterrorism gimmicks and 
adopting unwavering political strategies may induce some organizations to forgo violence 
and increase the consequences on those that don’t. This will ultimately result in fewer 
terrorist attacks and greater security for American citizens and U.S. military forces. 
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- A - 
ADB  Asian Development Bank 
AMULFA All-Muslim United Liberation Front of Assam 
APHC  All Parties Hurriyat [Freedom] Conference (Kashmir) 
ATTF  All-Tripura Tiger Force 
 
- B - 
BK  Babbar Khalsa (Punjab) 
BKI  Babbar Khalsa International (Punjab) 
BLT  Bodo Liberation Tigers (Assam) 
BSF  Border Security Force 
BTC  Bodo Territorial Council (Assam) 
BTFK  Bhindranwale Tiger Force of Khalistan (Punjab) 
 
- C - 
C3I  Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence 
CCS   Indian Cabinet Committee on Security 
CIA  Central Intelligence Agency (United States) 
CPA   Coalition Provisional Authority (Iraq) 
CPO  Central Police Organization 
CRPF  Central Reserve Police Force 
 
- D - 
DDDP  Directorate of Defence Policy and Planning (India) 
DoD   Department of Defense (United States) 
DONER Department of North East Region (India) 
DoS   Department of State (United States) 
DPG   U.S.-India Defense Planning Group 
 
- E - 
ESG   U.S.-India Executive Steering Group 
EU   European Union 
 
- F – 
 
- G – 
GPRN  Government of the People’s Republic of Nagaland 
 
- H – 
HuM  Hizb-ul-Mujahideen 
 
- I - 
IAF  Indian Air Force 
IB  Intelligence Bureau (India) 
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IED  Improvised Explosive Device 
IGC  Iraqi Governing Council 
INS  Immigration and Naturalization Service (United States) 
ISI  Inter-Services Intelligence (Pakistan) 
IT   Information Technology 
ITBP  Indo-Tibetan Border Police 
 
- J - 
J&K  Jammu and Kashmir 
JeM  Jaish-e-Mohammad (Pakistan) 
JI   Jama'at-i Islami (Pakistan) 
JIB  Jama'at-i Islami of Bangladesh 
JKLF  Jammu-Kashmir Liberation Front 
JKP  Jammu-Kashmir Police 
JTG   U.S.-India Joint Technical Group 
 
- K - 
KCF  Khalistan Commando Force (Punjab) 
KLF  Khalistan Liberation Force (Punjab) 
KLO  Kamatapur Liberation Organization 
 
- L - 
LeT / (LT) Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (a.k.a.) Lashkar-e-Toiba, 
LoC  Line of Control 
 
- M - 
MCG   Military Cooperation Group (U.S.-India) 
MHA  Ministry of Home Affairs (Indian Government) 
MOU   Memorandum of Understanding 
MULFA Muslim United Liberation Front of Assam 
MULTA  Muslim United Liberation Tigers of Assam 
 
- N - 
NC  National Conference (Kashmir) 
NDFB  National Democratic Front of Bodoland 
NEC  North East Council 
NEPA  North Eastern Police Academy 
NLI  Northern Light Infantry (Pakistan) 
NNC  Naga National Council 
NSA   National Security Agency (United States) 
NSCN-K National Socialist Council of Nagaland – Khaplang 
NSCN-IM National Socialist Council of Nagalim – Isak-Muivah  
NSEERS National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (United States) 
NWFP  Northwest Frontier Province 
 
- O - 
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- P - 
P-5   Permanent five members of the United Nations Security Council 
PAP  Punjab Armed Police 
PRC   People’s Republic of China 
 
- Q – 
 
- R - 
RAW  Research and Analysis Wing (India) 
 
- S - 
SATP  South Asian Terrorism Portal 
SOG  Special Operations Group 
SULFA  Surrendered ULFA members (Assam) 
 
- T - 
TEL  Terrorist Exclusion List (United States) 
 
- U - 
ULFA  United Liberation Front of Asom  
ULFSS United Liberation Front of the Seven Sisters 
UN   United Nations 
UNCIP  United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan 
UNGA  United Nations General Assembly 
UNMOGIP United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan 
UNPO  Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (the Hague) 
UNSC   United Nations Security Council 
 
- V - 
VISIT Visitor and Immigration Status Indication Technology System (United 
States) 
 
- W - 
WHO   World Health Organization 
WMD   Weapons of Mass Destruction 
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